

Stabilisation Case Study: Infrastructure in Helmand, Afghanistan (Experiences from Helmand 2008-2010)

Purpose

Stabilisation is the process of establishing peace and security in countries affected by conflict and instability. It aims to:

- Prevent or reduce violence;
- Protect people and key institutions;
- Promote political processes which lead to greater stability;
- Prepare for longer term non-violent politics and development.

Infrastructure related activities during stabilisation, either through its planning, development or its operation and maintenance, can contribute to all stabilisation goals to varying degrees and the way in which such activities are conceived, planned and implemented will determine how effective that contribution will be¹.

Key Messages

Stabilisation planning and implementation is about identifying and addressing the specific activities needed to achieve political stability in countries emerging from conflict. Infrastructure development is a part of political processes as much as any other activity and this must be factored into plans. This note provides ten good practice principles to achieve greater impact:

1. Develop a strategy, follow it and take (local) government along
2. Deliver projects that are good enough, expedite components
3. Respond to local demand and manage expectations
4. Establish a good information system, monitor and evaluate
5. Rationalise financing of the strategy
6. Use appropriate instruments to implement the strategy
7. Build capacity to implement the strategy, provide long term specialist support
8. Remember who the infrastructure belongs to
9. Follow robust procurement, contract and financial management procedures
10. Continually test what you do against 'Do No Harm' principles

¹ This note is based on experiences in Helmand between late 2008 and mid-2010. While it could be modified to cover other contexts, it was deemed preferable to retain specifics and detail. It should also be noted that the situation in Helmand has changed since mid-2010 and progress and future plans for specific projects used here as case study material may not have been achieved or materialised as hoped for.

Introduction

1. Stabilisation usually requires external, joint military and civilian support, a focus on improving the legitimacy and capability of the state, and providing tangible benefits to the population to underpin confidence both in the state and the political process². In Helmand, initially, the external, joint military and civilian support was led by the international community (by the Provincial Reconstruction Team, PRT) but to varying degrees over time the civilian and military support was being led by Afghans. The pace and balance that transition needs takes careful planning and management. This note generally describes what was led by the PRT, but many projects were implemented by the Afghan ministries with PRT support.

2. This section describes what is different about infrastructure development in stabilisation environments from 'normal' development. It also suggests how to prioritise support.

3. Infrastructure provides the essential basic services that people need for a decent, healthy, productive life – water supply and sanitation (with hygiene promotion); electricity; roads, other transport infrastructure and the services provided; municipal services (waste management, drainage, street lighting); irrigation; the public buildings necessary for a capable and performing system of government; as well as productive and economic infrastructure that provides the essential elements for economic growth (power stations, airfields, agricultural storage facilities, processing plants, etc)

- Infrastructure delivery can help improve the relationship between the state and the people.
- Infrastructure provides a gateway for dialogue with communities leading to improved communication between communities and government.
- Infrastructure that is demanded, planned, prioritised, delivered, operated and maintained is the tangible evidence of better governance.
- Badly conceived, poorly delivered, un-maintained infrastructure is a waste of resources, time and effort and can set back relationships and undermine other efforts towards stabilisation.
- Infrastructure can also become a target for insurgents and opposition to the government for what it represents.

4. “Stabilisation infrastructure” was a term coined in Helmand, Afghanistan to describe the collection of small localised building projects – repair, rehabilitation, refurbishment – that were undertaken by the Provincial Reconstruction Team to support stabilisation. It can be (and often is) as much about what it represents as what it actually is – it signifies government and the international community listening, responding, acting and delivering – it sends an important signal. Quick Impact Projects (QIPs) can be a first stage in the stabilisation process.

5. Conflict causes considerable damage to physical and economic infrastructure (marketplaces, warehouses, water, communication, energy facilities and transport networks) and undermines productive economic activity. It destroys workplaces, weakens

² Stabilisation Guidance Note - Executive Summary
<http://www.stabilisationunit.gov.uk/index.php/about-us/key-documents/62-stabilisation-guides>

labour markets and other economic institutions. It reduces the availability of productive land due to anti-personnel landmines and unexploded ordnance. Systems of land ownership may be lost or unworkable and productive assets stolen or destroyed. In addition, trading networks, vital for marketing goods and supplying businesses, are disrupted, and public and private sector investment declines. The macroeconomic instability that characterizes conflict and post-conflict contexts further limits the opportunities for licit economic activity.

6. Moreover, a typical country emerging from civil war faces a nearly 50% chance of returning to civil war³ and a country in conflict imposes a burden on its neighbours in terms of reducing their economic growth. Of the 34 countries furthest from reaching the Millennium Development Goals, 22 are in the midst of or emerging from violent conflict.

7. The global research that generated these findings, in particular that by Paul Collier, goes on to recommend that donors should invest in infrastructure in a large and sustained manner in post-conflict situations. This note identifies 10 key principles for such investment. Currently it draws much on experience from Helmand Province in Afghanistan between 2008 and 2010 and while Helmand was not yet in a 'post' conflict state, it can be argued that the same principles apply; and central Helmand had become sufficiently post-conflict in some areas to justify this. Most of the principles apply to both 'post-conflict' situations – and to contexts where conflict is ongoing. There are however differences between infrastructure 'for stabilisation' and infrastructure 'for development'.

8. National institutions are often very weak, dysfunctional, deeply political and possibly sectarian, infiltrated or deserted. In stabilisation environments, rapidly improving a state's authority, competence and legitimacy is important for the political process. It can help give it credibility, allow political negotiation to proceed with greater fairness and accountability and uphold the implementation of political agreements. Infrastructure delivery can contribute to this.

9. Due to the nature of contemporary armed conflict, stabilisation environments are characterised by: the proliferation of predatory armed groups, for whom war and criminal activity are a livelihood (encouraging an increase in minor, opportunistic crime, including looting); the development of criminal networks, often with regional and international dimensions; the disappearance of the machinery of government; and the emergence of security voids that open the way to competing forms of political authority⁴. Infrastructure development needs to take this into account.

10. Many difficulties are faced by infrastructure providers in conflict situations, some of these can be easily identified and mitigated by providers. However, other issues do not become apparent until later stages of development. Literature reviews and experiences by providers reveal the following to be the key issues affecting infrastructure provision⁵:

Immediate issues

- Lack of security

³ World Bank (2003) Breaking the conflict trap: Civil war and development policy, Policy and Research Report, Oxford University Press.

⁴ The Military Contribution to Security Sector Reform, Joint Doctrine Note 3/07, p.1-1.

⁵ Provision of Infrastructure in Post Conflict Situations; Mott MacDonald; June 2005.

- Hazards such as land-mines and disease
- Inappropriate funding (too slow or too large for quick, small projects)
- Lack of data, plans, surveys, records, condition assessments, monitoring and performance reports

Underlying problems

- Identification of the causes of conflict
- Lack of institutional / management capacity
- Corruption (real and perceived)
- Lack of political will
- Weak governance
- Weak implementation capacity

Problems of response

- Weak or absent strategies / absence of sector prioritisation
- Stakeholders, their diversity and their range of interests and incentives
- Access to populations, undermining opportunities to ascertain real needs and demands
- Specific technical weaknesses of existing infrastructure
- Difficulty of mobilising the involvement of civil society and NGOs
- Difficulty of implementing participatory methodologies given insecurity and suspicion
- Difficulty of balancing long and short-term solutions, meeting immediate needs but achieving long-term sustainability
- Lack of local qualified technical staff
- Procurement, where procedures are poorly suited to need

11. Priorities will, in early stages, be basic services of water supply and sanitation, shelter, energy services and basic access to transport infrastructure and services. Secondary priorities will be determined by the context and the background level of development of the country or region. For example, while Afghanistan is one of the poorest countries in the world, Helmand Province was perhaps better served with infrastructure; basic services were available in many parts of the province (c.f. Iraq, a middle income country where there was largely ample provision of basic services). Political priorities may determine infrastructure priorities. In Helmand, the “campaign plan”, and what became the Helmand Plan for 2010, dictated geographical priorities that had a bearing on infrastructure planning. In post-conflict situations, priorities should be set to the greatest extent possible in line with community and government demand.

12. The extent to which infrastructure development can contribute to helping avoid a return to conflict will depend on context and the underlying drivers of conflict. Thorough analysis will be needed, but there are examples where infrastructure development has made a tangible contribution to avoiding a return to conflict (the Enguri Dam in Georgia⁵).

Ten good practice principles

1. Develop a strategy, follow it and take (local) government along

Projects and programmes should be aligned with and support (or at the very least be de-conflicted with) host nation strategies and other efforts of the international community.

The extent to which this can be done will depend on the level at which the project or programme is operating - regional, national, sub-national, district, municipal.

In the absence of formal strategies or where national plans have not been cascaded down to lower levels, develop one. Even though pressure to deliver will have a short term horizon, the benefits of developing a workable strategy will be many. (But continue to develop and implement projects that make sense – do not await the perfect strategy). Lack of strategic direction can lead to ad-hoc, short-term, stop-start and incoherent approaches to infrastructure development.

Given staff turnover rates are usually higher than in normal operating environments, sometimes inconsistent funding mechanisms and typically long planning, design and implementation timetables for infrastructure compared to other rapidly changing stabilisation activity, the lack of a longer term strategy can leave individual projects as ad-hoc, discrete interventions with consequently lower impact than might otherwise be achieved. Also, much infrastructure (especially roads, energy and irrigation) is part of a network that is more beneficial when developed as such – hence the need for a strategy.

In Helmand at the end of 2008, there was limited strategic direction for infrastructure other than a basic identification of the main road network in the province; there were very few firm projects planned for its development and only indicative financing was in place.

Planning frameworks within which infrastructure could be considered included:

- The Afghanistan National Development Strategy (ANDS) included sector strategies and targets, but it had not yet been cascaded down to the provincial level.
- A Provincial Development Plan (PDP) which was essentially a list of projects.
- The 2008 Helmand Infrastructure Scoping Study (HISS) which provided some direction and initial prioritisation but lacked detail on implementation.
- Stabilisation projects which were focused on district centres but, while they were locally demand-driven and consistent and coherent in their own right, they were treated in isolation.
- DFID's Country Business Plan which set out very high level goals in line with the ANDS.
- The Helmand Road Map, that was to become the Helmand Plan 2010, which provided strategic objectives to guide the Provincial Reconstruction Team (PRT) but had only an annual perspective – a particular constraint as far as infrastructure development is concerned. District Stabilisation Plans complemented this provincial plan.

There were two weaknesses:

- (i) Plans at that time took no account of spatial issues between district centres – a literal gap as far as network infrastructure was concerned (in particular for roads and irrigation, but also true for energy services) – they focused on stabilisation in district centres.
- (ii) Most failed to adequately capture the campaign strategy in any meaningful way. They could not be expected to. It was not until the Helmand Plan 2010 set out the conditions-based approach to district stabilisation and stressed a focus on the five districts of central Helmand that one could genuinely fit an infrastructure development strategy within a higher level planning framework.

Nevertheless, it was possible to construct a basic provincial Helmand Infrastructure Strategy (HIS) by early 2010. This was achieved through working from the ANDS, the PDP and the HISS; by building a database of ongoing and planned projects, by using the conditions-based approach of the Helmand Plan 2010 and by recognising that the PRT is supporting an evolution from QIPs (Quick Impact Projects) through stabilisation to longer term development. A first version of the HIS was in a form that can be updated on a 6-monthly basis. It exists to guide what was to be done but

also what should **not** be done (new personnel arrive with new sets of ideas and ambition – it is essential that inappropriate proposals can be rejected efficiently). The HIS also became a valuable communication product, in particular to cope with frequent turnover of staff and the need for continual briefing.

It was important as a contribution to what was termed Afghanisation - though drafted from within the PRT it was shared with GoIRoA and a process of transferring its ownership and leadership to the provincial government began.

The principle stresses the need to take *local* government along, largely because it is at this level that one can establish and strengthen the direct relationship between a weakly trusted government and its constituents. The value of having a strategy also comes into its own when donor funding is being sought, donors will be reluctant to finance seemingly ad-hoc unconnected stand-alone projects.

2. Deliver projects that are good enough, expedite components

While principle #1 urges a strategic approach, there will be opportunities for progressing some projects that do not need to wait for a strategy to be ready, that will fit within that emerging framework in due course. Some will exist in national strategies and sector plans as was the case of the National Highway between Gereshk and Lashkar Gah.

One of the major projects that DFID supported was the design (with intentions to co-finance implementation) of the rehabilitation of the Gereshk Hydro-Electric Power Plant and the town distribution system. In order to respond to demand and local expectations and to demonstrate that the UK government and the PRT were committed to the long term it was decided to find a way to start some aspects of the long-term project as soon as possible. The PRT was able to expedite the upgrading of the access road to the power station using DFID funds, PRT implementation procedures with project and contract management oversight by the Specialist Team Royal Engineers (STRE) who worked for the PRT. An essential part of the approach was the involvement of local government and the Gereshk District Stabilisation Team (DST).

‘Good enough’ projects should do no harm and contribute to repairing the relationship between communities and government. For example, in normal circumstances road network rehabilitation and development would be planned on the basis of transport demand drawn from user surveys; in a stabilisation context this is unlikely to be possible and a list of priority projects may need to be developed based on other factors such as adequate security, willingness of contractors to work and effectiveness of embryonic local governance processes.

3. Respond to local demand and manage expectations

Normal development processes of assessing demand (consultation, participatory planning, surveys, current data, etc) are likely to be problematic in conflict and post-conflict situations.

In Helmand, demand was identified through a pragmatic process of working between Stabilisation Advisers and District Governors - not a perfect process but good enough and, locally, politically astute.

A recurring theme in Helmand was how to respond to local demand and manage expectations. This arose over potential mini-hydro-electric power generation.

Nobody can arrive in Helmand and not be amazed at the size of the river, and of the irrigation

system that was built in the 1960s and 70s. Many assumptions are made about the abundance of water and that hydro-power should be easy to develop. Local people have attempted in the recent past to install small turbines at some locations, and one or two are at the site of old water mills. Some of these efforts have worked, though not particularly well, and some have not.

Mini-hydro-power development appears to be simple and indeed local communities have approached Task Force Helmand (TFH) and District Stabilisation Teams on several occasions for help in mobilising the potential. But it is not so simple. Mini-hydro-power has had mixed success elsewhere in Afghanistan. The Helmand Arghandab Valley Authority (HAVA), the government body who own the irrigation assets, do not like people installing water wheels and turbines on their canals as this can damage the fabric of the canal and the structures as well as disturb flows. Consideration needs to be given to subsequent arrangements for management, operation and maintenance, identifying demand and its location, agreeing distribution arrangements, determining how and who will set tariffs and be responsible for operation and maintenance. Thorough engineering feasibility studies need to be undertaken.

Expectations of quick and easy solutions have been raised. Teams on the ground need to be able to manage these expectations. It is frustrating for all involved but if failures of the past are to be avoided, sites need to be investigated thoroughly. DFID's consultants are now in place to carry out such investigation, feasibility and design and they will coordinate their findings on one site to inform what might be possible elsewhere.

The risk of not responding to demand and managing expectations is loss of good relationships with communities, confidence and trust; thus undermining the stabilisation effort. Equally, well managed relationships provide opportunities for communication of positive impacts on the local economy.

Importantly, the use of labour based methods for infrastructure development is a tried and tested approach and was in-built into the DFID road project design. Local procurement of contractors and material was also a high priority.

4. Establish a good information system, monitor and evaluate

A problem which affects infrastructure development is the "lack of data, plans, surveys, condition assessments, monitoring and performance reports". Linked closely to principle #1 above is that the strategy will hopefully stand the test of time – it needs to be backed up with an adequate information system.

To support the development of a strategy, it is essential to establish a good database. In early 2009 the Helmand PRT lacked a comprehensive baseline or stock-take of what existed and what was required in terms of infrastructure across sectors. What existed was not easily accessible (in different incompatible systems), inconsistent (some sectors had data, some did not) and scattered (between military, PRT and district systems). At times, too much was left to individuals to operate their own systems and institutional memory was not strong.

A schedule of "Priority Infrastructure in Helmand" was prepared in mid-2009 which guided thematic work – with hindsight it should have been used more rigorously. The Rule-of-Law team usefully got to grips with the infrastructure stock in their sector by mid-2010. Improvements are now being made through the development of a comprehensive M&E system for the PRT and DFID.

Given the rationale that infrastructure development contributes to stabilisation goals, it is important that M&E data and indicators attempt to measure that effect. The actual infrastructure projects themselves can be high risk given the context and uncertainties,

planning assumptions may not hold true. Intended and unintended impact needs to be monitored, in particular on perceptions of government, to enable adjustments to be made.

5. Rationalise financing of the strategy

The challenge in Helmand was not one of securing more financial resources, even for costly infrastructure, it was one of rationalising what was available and simplifying the rules that govern its use, while ensuring robust procedures are followed.

Using the road sector as an example. In early 2010 the road sector was being developed through projects financed by DFID, the Asian Development Bank (ADB), the PRT, USAID, the United Arab Emirates, TFH, the Ministry of Rural Rehabilitation and Development (MRRD) and the US-CERP (the US Commanders Emergency Response Program). While there were mechanisms for joining up, there were instances of the same projects being pursued along two or more channels of prospective funding. There is a need:


- to find ways for major donors, who are not used to co-financing, to do so;
- to further develop some aspects of the PRT’s Conflict Pool financing procedures – at least introduce multi-year⁶ and programmatic financing;
- to simplify DFID’s procurement and financial management procedures for conflict situations⁷;
- to find a way to access the considerable resources of the US CERP.

It is also important, in addition to substantial long term financing for large scale infrastructure, that finance is available for Quick Impact Projects and other smaller local initiatives. The PRT’s resources through the Conflict Pool served this purpose well.

6. Use appropriate instruments to implement the strategy

Figure 1 depicts a range of aid instruments and approaches that were being used by the UK government in Helmand. Some donors followed similar methods (eg USAID and Denmark) while others were not managed through the PRT (such as the UAE financing schools, mosques and a road, and another government financing a health clinic). When it comes to financing stabilisation and development there remains room for improvement.

Figure 1. Aid instruments and ways of working in the PRT



⁶ The Conflict Pool will allow multi-year funding from UK FY 2012/13.

⁷ In 2010 DFID began investigating this issue.

DFID's approach to designing and implementing the Lashkar Gah to Gereshk Road Improvement Project followed a conventional donors' design and approval process for DFID and ADB. With hindsight this was perhaps not the best approach. While the financing benefits (more funds) and political capital of working with the ADB, with the intention of financing the eventual project through them, were laudable, the approach resulted in adopting unnecessarily high design, appraisal and implementation standards and the dis-benefits were delays, (potential) loss of credibility alongside military and other colleagues, unnecessary complexity, raised project cost and reinforcing centralisation (in Kabul) of decision-making. In summary, we needed an instrument that applied the design and appraisal rigour of DFID combined with the flexibility of the Conflict Fund – DFID needed an instrument to suit the sector and the context. Alternatively DFID may have done better to commit to design and implement a roads programme for Helmand rather than one specific major road project – this was how DFID was trying to work with MRRD (see next box).

7. Build capacity to implement the strategy, provide long term specialist support

The exit strategy for stabilisation will be an evolution to (longer-term) development. "Afghanisation" is a major theme of the ISAF⁸ campaign and is mainly applied to the handover of lead responsibility for security from ISAF to the Afghan National Security Forces. However the approach of putting partner governments in the lead is normal development business and capacity building naturally follows. We needed to adopt more of this approach.

Support in water resources management was crafted in the right way, but support for rural reconstruction and development was not as well designed.

Following the HISS mission in October 2008 and from mid 2009, DFID began supporting the Helmand River Basin Study and Master Plan (HRBMP) - DFID funded a scoping study phase, extended this through a phase of interim support and will be financing, together with the ADB, the full study which will:

- develop the longer term master plan
- identify priority projects suitable for investment
- provide on-call expertise for operational activities and advising on the long term consequences of others' stabilisation activities around the irrigation network.

In contrast support for rural reconstruction and development with MRRD was inconsistent. DFID financed a project from 2006 - the Helmand Agriculture and Rural Development Project (HARDP). By early 2010 HARDP had been deemed to have run its course and DFID were not planning to finance RR&D through MRRD; yet at the same time the PRT was trying to do more with them locally, in particular with mentoring from the PRT's STRE.

An exit strategy from stabilisation will be a transition to longer term development, support to infrastructure will continue to be in demand, both in terms of capacity building of GoIRoA counterpart ministries and of expertise within the PRT and DFID. Given the various arrangements for infrastructure advice and engineering expertise, the numerous mechanisms for financing infrastructure development as described above, the limitations of continual changes of personnel and the imperative to "develop a strategy and stick to it" a key lesson is that it would be more efficient and effective to have established a longer-term, Helmand-specific, but less project-specific, call-down arrangement for specialist support. It would include responsibility for documentation as well as sector monitoring and evaluation and, potentially, research.

⁸ NATO's International Security Assistance Force

8. Remember to whom the infrastructure belongs

A difficult problem arises when an area is seen as a military 'theatre of operation'. The understandable military focus on the campaign 'theatre' and battle space can lead to overlooking that it is sovereign territory. This happened when irrigation infrastructure in Helmand became a contested area in early 2010.

HAVA close main canal gates for canal maintenance for a 40 day period each winter. This means that significant lengths of canal have no flow and only a little water remains ponded.

In early 2010 planning for Operation Moshtarak was underway that included detailed plans for ground operations in the Marjah area. A proposal was formulated by military commanders to ensure that all canals in the Marjah area would be at their normal operating levels by the time of the ground operations – in order to restrict the movement of insurgents from one area to the next. This would need canal control gates to be opened before the full maintenance period was complete. The PRT was asked for its recommendation.

In January 2010 meteorological predictions were forecasting less than average rainfall in the 2010 season (March-April), remote sensing of snow cover in the mountains that feed the Helmand river was showing less-than-average depths and higher temperatures than usual were causing earlier-than-normal snowmelt. The Kajaki reservoir was at lower-than-normal levels for the time of year.

The PRT concluded and recommended that (a) a decision to open canal gates early, if there was to be one, should be taken and announced only by GoIRoA and HAVA not by the PRT or ISAF, but that (b) the PRT did not recommend any change to regular maintenance practices – the consequences of drought conditions or water resource problems later in the year and a population whose livelihood is dependent upon irrigation water becoming aware that the PRT had not prevented "wastage" of water earlier in the year, to support military operations, could have severely undermined relationships and harmed livelihoods. In fact the proposal was not taken up and HAVA's normal operating and maintenance regime was adhered to.

9. Follow robust procurement, contract and financial management procedures

The construction industry is well known for its propensity for corrupt practices⁹. Conflict and post-conflict environments are also highly susceptible¹⁰. Afghanistan is rated as one of the most corrupt countries in the world and Helmand is the centre of the opium trade. It is critical that robust procurement, contract and financial management practices are followed. The PRT's STRE undertook extensive awareness raising, orientation and training of local Afghan contractors vying for construction business from the PRT. They also followed UK standard industry practice.

There needs to be scope for creativity however. As DFID found itself in direct implementation of works contracts at the Bost Airfield and Agriculture Business Park, they were able to develop innovative arrangements delegating project and contract management authority to another UK government entity - the PRT's STRE - while retaining financial authority. This was the first time that such an arrangement had been implemented by DFID and it worked well.

⁹ Construction Sector Transparency Initiative, CoST.

¹⁰ Corruption in Construction and Post-conflict Reconstruction; Global Corruption Report 2005; Transparency International. War Games – The Story of Aid and War in Modern Times; Linda Polman; 2010.

10. Continually test what you do against 'Do No Harm' principles

A particular problem in fragile states is that donors are reluctant to let go and handover responsibility to host governments, often the governments' systems are not sufficiently robust for channelling finance, procurement is not transparent, implementation capacity is often low and monitoring systems are non-existent. These problems were exacerbated in Helmand. To compound them, identification of need and demand is difficult.

Military teams on the ground are often on tours of 6-12 months with a strong desire "to do something" and "to demonstrate what has been achieved"; their commitment is commendable. But there is a delicate balance to be found between finding initiatives that can be supported, that demonstrate commitment to the local populations but that do not undermine longer term capability of GoIRoA and accountability to their citizens. It is a hard lesson to apply but *just because you can do something does not mean that you necessarily should*, or as one commander put it "don't just do something, stand there!"

Resources and further information

General Stabilisation Planning Documents

- Their Stabilisation and Conflict Lessons Resource (SCLR) is an online collection of hundreds of key documents and summaries which highlight lessons, supporting the community of conflict and stabilisation policy makers and practitioners (www.stabilisationunit.gov.uk/SCLR).
- Guidance Note –Executive Summary, UK Approach to Stabilisation, <http://www.stabilisationunit.gov.uk/index.php/about-us/key-documents/62-stabilisation-guides/105-stabilisation-guidance-note-executive-summary>
- Stabilisation Issues Notes:
 - Human Rights
 - Disarmament, Demobilisation and Reintegration
 - Governance and Public Administration Reform
 - Economic Regeneration and Private Sector Development
 - Security Sector and Rule of Law<http://www.stabilisationunit.gov.uk/stabilisation-and-conflict-resources/stabilisation-unit-publications.html>
- Security and Stabilisation: The Military Contribution: <http://www.mod.uk/NR/rdonlyres/993D9435-233B-460A-87F8-1B1250A48208/0/JDP340Guideweb.pdf>

Infrastructure and Stabilisation References

- DFID's Infrastructure Strategy: Making Connections

HMG Resources and contact points on Infrastructure and Stabilisation

- FCO Conflict Group: leads on policy for security sector and rule of law support in conflict and post-conflict environments and policy towards transitional justice mechanisms, housing, land and property issues.
- DFID Conflict, Humanitarian & Security Department (CHASE): can provide some policy and programme assistance to HMG country teams, either directly or by referring them to other sources of expertise.

- DFID Infrastructure Group: Head of Profession and advisers have both personal experience and manage Framework Engineering Consultants for specialist, deployable advice.
- Stabilisation Unit (SU): The SU's Lessons, Planning and Country Operations Group can provide advice to any HMG department operating in or planning for stabilisation environments. This can include advice on tools and approaches to effective integrated HMG planning and management of stabilisation operations.

Training

- Stabilisation Unit Planning Courses, Modules 1 & 2
- DFID's Infrastructure Group – Advisors retreats

Other Resources

- Register of Engineers for Disaster Relief, REDR

Recommended reading

- Wars, Guns and Votes: Democracy in Dangerous Places; Paul Collier; 2009.
- Principles for good international engagement in fragile states; Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD); 2005.
- Service Delivery in Countries Emerging From Conflict; Tony Vaux and Emma Visman; CICS, Department of Peace Studies, University of Bradford; January 2005.
- Provision of Infrastructure in Post Conflict Situations; Mott MacDonald; June 2005. Note that "Appendix A: Bibliography" of this document contains a further 40 references.
- World Bank (2003) Breaking the conflict trap: Civil war and development policy; Policy and Research Report, Oxford University Press.
- Corruption in Construction and Post-conflict Reconstruction; Global Corruption Report 2005; Transparency International.
- War Games – The Story of Aid and War in Modern Times; Linda Polman; 2010.
- World Development Report 2011 (forthcoming).

Contact

- Commander 170 Infrastructure Engineering Support Group, Royal Engineers.
The Specialist Team of Royal Engineers (STRE) falls under 170 Infrastructure Engineering Support Group. 170 is divided into six works groups (WGs) catering for different thematic areas e.g. power, water, rail etc. Each of these WGs are supported by two to four STRE's. The expertise and complexion of the individual STRE will depend upon the requirement of the WGs. In the context of Helmand, two STRE's are operational. 505 STRE provide direct infrastructure support to the military, whilst 502 provide dedicated support to the HPRT.