

The UK Approach to Stabilisation

Stabilisation Unit Guidance Notes

1. Stabilisation: Emerging UK Experience and Best Practice

2. Stabilisation: A Matrix of Possible Tasks

November 2008

STABILISATION: EMERGING UK EXPERIENCE AND BEST PRACTICE

Foreword

The two Stabilisation Guidance Notes presented in this publication are designed to serve complementary purposes.

Stabilisation: UK Experience and Emerging Best Practice has been produced by the Stabilisation Unit to set out in one document the lessons of UK experience in stabilisation interventions to date, and emerging guidance on what constitutes best practice and achieves a successful impact. Stabilisation is a summary term for the complex processes that have to be undertaken in countries experiencing, or emerging from, violent conflict to achieve peace and security and a political settlement that leads to legitimate government. This complexity means considerable length in a document that seeks to be comprehensive. Ideally, readers will have time to go through it, but if not, it can be used as a reference document on different topics. The only word of caution is that it is work-in-progress, as indeed is our understanding of what constitutes successful stabilisation.

Stabilisation: A Matrix of Possible Tasks has more complex goals. First, it seeks to define the full range of possible activities that may need to be undertaken in stabilisation – what these comprise and how they should be undertaken. Second, it suggests the respective roles in implementation between the military (M), police (P) and civilians (C) in the different environments confronted in stabilisation. And third, it identifies skill sets required to complete the different tasks and their components.

This agenda originates in the debate over task leadership in stabilisation and particularly what the military should prepare for and undertake in 'non-permissive' environments – a question brought to the fore in Iraq and Afghanistan. What is presented here is a 'menu' of possibilities, elements of which may be relevant in planning and implementation in different stabilisation environments. The Matrix is essentially a guide and checklist.

Further detailed guidance can be obtained from the Stabilisation Unit's series of Stabilisation Information Notes covering key areas in stabilisation, which are being published separately.

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and Commonwealth Office and Department for International Development, they do not represent official HMG policy documents.

Richard Teuten, Head of Stabilisation Unit

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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

In the context of an extensive and rapidly growing 'literature' on conflict and fragile states, this overall Guidance Note starts in its introductory sections by explaining its rationale: to set out the lessons of experience, emerging best practice, and the keys to success in stabilisation in one document.

Part 1 then concentrates on preparation for stabilisation interventions. Stabilisation is the summary term for the essential processes (military, humanitarian, political and developmental) that are required to establish peace and security and put in place a political settlement that produces a legitimate government in states that have experienced (and sometimes still are experiencing) violent conflict.

The different dimensions and fundamental characteristics of stabilisation are set out. Major lessons of experience so far are to: recognise the complexity and uncertainty of the action required; ensure an integrated, comprehensive approach between local authorities and external partners; and build on as much understanding and sensitivity to the local environment as can be generated. The priorities of local authorities and significant power groups must form the core of recovery plans and these must include some at least of the interests of the 'spoilers'.

The essential assessment and planning process for stabilisation interventions is the next focus. UK objectives in the country provide a starting point in assessment, which could follow different methodologies but which must provide as much understanding as possible of the causes of conflict and the main actors and interests involved. On this basis an Integrated Stabilisation Plan should be prepared and agreed between major internal and external stakeholders as an initial framework for intervention. The plan must be monitored rigorously and modified and updated frequently in what will be rapidly changing circumstances.

Part 2 concentrates on practical guidelines for interventions to ensure successful implementation of stabilisation strategies and plans. Practical interventions often have to have a number of trade-offs: between support for short-term developments to build confidence in peace among the population (peace dividends) and longer-term development; between substituting for failed governments and building up state capacity; and between choosing local partners we can work with and excluding powerful groups that can wreck political settlements.

A number of essential priorities in practical stabilisation are then picked out and discussed. Quick Impact Projects (QIPs) are one of the most common ways of beginning stabilisation, to demonstrate an initial peace

dividend, but though they appear simple and straightforward, principles shaping their design and implementation have emerged and should be followed to ensure a successful impact.

Effective state-building is perhaps the central priority in stabilisation and needs to be understood in three dimensions: achieving a political settlement that incorporates the interests of the main power and interest groups; putting in place the state's 'survival' functions – security, the rule of law and taxation; and being able in some measure to meet citizens' expectations on the availability of basic services.

Finally, the need to factor in the roles and interests of women (a UN Security Council commitment) and the observance of human rights and humanitarian law during stabilisation planning and implementation is highlighted. Experience has shown that these elements are often overlooked.

Part 3 covers the actual tasks that may need to be completed in stabilisation interventions. Though it is complete in its own right, it is in part a summary of the much more detailed inventory of possible tasks presented in the second Stabilisation Guidance Note in this compilation – Stabilisation: A Matrix of Possible Tasks.

Nine key areas are picked out and analysed to identify best practice in achieving effectiveness and reform: peace processes; security and the rule of law; Disarmament, Demobilisation and Reintegration (DDR); four aspects of governance – capacity-building in public administration, anti-corruption measures, holding free and fair elections and strengthening parliaments and political parties; restoring basic services, infrastructure and livelihoods; and fostering job creation and private sector development in local economies.

One last factor that is as important as tangible activity is an effective strategic communications programme – informing the country population and the UK population to ensure continuing acceptance of, and support for, the stabilisation intervention and promoting understanding and trust between international and local actors.

INTRODUCTION

Why do we need this guide?

'Stabilisation' for the UK is both the goal to be achieved and the nature of support to countries emerging from violent conflict. This note sets out a UK Government view of what is involved, mainly based on experience so far. The issues discussed here are valid for everyone involved in stabilisation.

The paper tries to set out best practice in how we assess, plan, resource and carry out stabilisation operations. Readers will come to the paper from many different angles: some may be thinking ahead to a possible operation, but others may already be involved in stabilisation, or a particular activity within it. The aim is to help readers think about the way activities within stabilisation are linked, and how they interact in a complex operation.

It suggests the questions to ask, not stock answers

Where stabilisation is required, the situation is always deeply complex, and can only be fundamentally resolved through local settlements and institutions. There is no template for external support. But we also know which questions to ask in order to understand our role and contribution. The international community's willingness to help countries emerge from conflict has emphasised that even when wars are 'won' militarily, what follows is a period of highly volatile and often violent political, economic and social dispute – requiring stabilisation.

"The lesson is that while there are military victories there never is a military 'solution'. There's only military action that creates the space for economic and political life."

Foreign Secretary David Miliband, speech to Labour Party Conference, 25 September 2007

Stabilisation operations are increasingly integrated and international

Virtually all UK stabilisation operations are part of an international coalition. Many of our international partners have also recognised the need for a more comprehensive approach that seeks to engage the military, political, humanitarian and development actors in a coherent operation. The increasing number of complex UN peacekeeping and peace-building missions is a result of the perception that the classic UN responses have sometimes proved insufficient to support a sustainable transition from conflict to peace.

Recent conflicts such as in Bosnia, Kosovo, Afghanistan and Iraq have seen an increasing role for the UK military in helping countries to achieve stability and recovery after the cessation of large-scale military hostilities. Our military now routinely engages with civilian organisations within the UK Government and in multinational, multi-agency environments.

It is a guide for UK officials and officers

Civilian leadership in such circumstances has to address the challenges of integrated security, diplomatic and development planning and implementation. But there are significant challenges involved in agreeing a single vision, ensuring unity of effort and working out how military and civilian activities contribute. The respective roles of civilian organisations must also be worked out, especially when it may not be feasible for civilians to move around freely in hostile zones. This note aims to help UK officials and officers to think these challenges through and draw some operational conclusions to guide practice.

A single document sums up the UK's approach to stabilisation

This note draws on much excellent policy, guidance and doctrine material from DFID, FCO and MOD, as well as material on stabilisation from other governments and organisations internationally. However, there is currently no other single document which sets out in clear terms for UK participants what is meant by stabilisation, and what it involves. Even on this basis, caution is required. This document tries to set out best practice and is based on experience to date – but stabilisation programmes are continuously evolving.

The keys to success

The ideal programme and sequence of intervention is not hard to describe. After in-depth analysis of the situation and its problems, a clear strategy and set of policies are drawn up and agreed with other external partners and with the important and acceptable power centres within the country. Adequate resources in material, money and personnel are mobilised. Effective decision-making, coordination and communication procedures are put in place. Logistic support is laid on quickly and effectively. And implementation proceeds smoothly and efficiently.

In practice, however, there are likely to be constraints on resources and gaps in the expertise required for planning and executing stabilisation. Sequences of actions are interrupted, agreements take too long or are broken, and unforeseen problems appear in what are highly volatile, unstable environments. There is often no clear local authority with whom to engage. These are the realities that have to be accommodated. But there are a number of key guidelines that can help to make a decisive impact.

'Good enough' strategies, policies and plans

Aim for what is required and adequate rather than ideal and complete. It will never be possible to pre-empt or counter all problems simultaneously and immediately. The essential elements are sequencing, limited responses focusing on the most urgent issues, deliberate postponement of the apparently intractable, and compromise.

Leadership and coordination

Strong leadership immeasurably improves the chances of successful outcomes – leadership in the political sense, in the field; a single acknowledged authority with a formal mandate and the ability to make decisions. Effective coordination is an equally important element of good leadership, especially in combined stabilisation programmes with several external partners and internal actors. But efforts to be 'complete' may be impossible and hold things up dangerously.

Close civilian-military cooperation

The need for integrated planning, with military objectives supporting civilian stabilisation aims, is now generally accepted. Because of the different organisational cultures, genuine unity of effort requires civilians who understand the military and vice versa. The comparative size and momentum of military involvement creates a huge impact and makes it essential that the military understands its role in the overall strategy. Civilian organisations must ensure that they have the structures and skills to engage with military planning processes as well as with each other's approaches; the military needs to take account of the fact that it is playing a role in stabilisation efforts with outcomes delivered over months and years.

PART 1 – PREPARATION

Understanding stabilisation

Stabilisation is a fairly new term in conflict management and peace-building. It complements and draws upon, rather than replaces, existing approaches. It refers to an approach used in violent situations where it is difficult or impossible to pursue conventional programmes. Its aims are explicitly political: to help establish and sustain a legitimate government. And it often involves a degree of military coercion to reduce violence sufficiently to allow recovery, development and peace-building programmes.

The objectives of stabilisation

- **Prevent – or contain – violent conflict**
This may require coercive as well as political intervention, whilst working towards addressing the causes of underlying tensions. It may also involve active pursuit of groups who refuse to take part in a non-violent political process.
- **Protect people and key assets and institutions**
Where violence persists, a minimum precondition for stability is the provision (possibly by external military forces acting in support of local ones) of sufficient security for men, women and children to begin going about their daily lives and for government to function.
- **Promote political processes which lead to greater stability**
The main aim is to achieve political settlements which make it in parties' interests to contest power and resources peacefully rather than violently.
- **Prepare for longer-term development**
Stabilisation activities can profoundly affect the chances of successful social and economic development.

What defines stabilisation?

Stabilisation differs from humanitarian and development activities

Humanitarian, development and stabilisation activities often share operational 'space'. But although the activities may appear similar, the guiding principles are different:

- Stabilisation has explicitly political aims

- Humanitarian assistance is strictly neutral
- Development, for the UK, always focuses on poverty

The activity that most overlaps with stabilisation is 'early recovery', which has political and security dimensions as well as development objectives. Usually the objectives of all these activities are complementary. However, sometimes they can be in tension – when, for example, the UK aims simultaneously to deliver humanitarian and stabilisation assistance, while being involved militarily.

Stabilisation aims for a non-violent political settlement

Although force may be used in support of stabilisation, the aim – as in all the UK Government's approaches to conflict – is a non-violent political settlement or interim accommodation. The 'exit plan' for stabilisation is for the state to provide the functions (particularly security) essential for long-term stability. This requires an understanding of how achieving a political settlement and providing state functions can reinforce each other.

Stabilisation requires external intervention but local settlement

External intervention is usually necessary to compensate for the weakness of domestic institutions and political processes, but stability can only be achieved by a political settlement between local actors. 'External' often means intervention from outside the country, but the intervention can simply be from outside a particular troubled region or part of the state.

Stabilisation requires integrated military and civilian activity

Stopping violence requires leadership from (and of) the diplomatic and development communities to support political processes and help the state fulfil its functions. But because it takes place in situations where humanitarian, development and peace-building efforts are severely impeded by armed violence, stabilisation usually requires significant military contributions (often from UN-mandated forces rather than single nations or coalitions) to provide the essential security to allow non-military actors to operate. Those involved in stabilisation need to recognise that, initially at least, the military might be the only organisation capable of operating within an area due to the nature of the conflict.

Stabilisation may be broader than counter-insurgency

Counter-insurgency (often known as COIN) is often at the heart of stabilisation. Counter-insurgency doctrine recognises the political and economic basis on which an insurgency attracts popular support, and focuses on those areas as well as using force. However there are some cases where, even when the insurgency has been contained, stabilisation may not have been achieved. And in other situations, the UK and the international community may not be engaged in a counter-insurgency campaign despite being involved in stabilisation activities in that country.

Stabilisation involves integrated peacekeeping or peace-enforcement operations

Although these operations form the military platform for stabilisation, they are not always conducted in a way that integrates military, development and diplomatic actors. The importance of this integration is reflected in the fact that the UN sometimes uses the term 'multidimensional peacekeeping' for stabilisation and in the new UK military task 'Military Assistance to Stabilisation and Development' (MASD), which emphasises integrated planning.

Stabilisation is a long and uncertain process

Stabilisation is not a linear process, though a sense of vision and direction about a possible steady state is crucial to any stabilisation strategy. Instead, stabilisation often involves iterative movement through the progressive stages of stability, usually punctuated by setbacks and lurches forward. Stabilisation can have no pre-determined duration, and some countries require active military engagement complementing peace-building efforts for many years. In any conflict affected country, stabilisation activities may occur in parallel with development activities and/or offensive military operations in different parts of the country.

Humanitarian or stabilisation projects?

Apolitical humanitarian work often coexists – and is sometimes confused with – stabilisation work, which has explicitly political aims.

The apolitical and independent nature of humanitarian agencies has generally (but not always) enabled them to work amid conflict unhindered by the belligerents. But stabilisation projects in the context of counter-insurgency can lead to the perception that all development-type activities carried out by foreigners are political. In addition, foreign forces' well-meaning protection of humanitarian workers can seriously compromise their claims of independence, and open them to attack by insurgents.

Where stabilisation and humanitarian activities are going on side by side, those carrying them out need to discuss, in an open and understanding way, whether these risks can be born and how they can be mitigated.

Experience: take a comprehensive approach

Stabilisation requires all those involved – whether their perspective is security, politics or development – to take a comprehensive approach. This means compromising, understanding, persevering, and recognising that the three 'communities' (military, humanitarian and developmental) have different underlying objectives, cultures and expectations about timescales. Some key lessons which have emerged in recent years are summarised below.

Understand the specifics of the situation and don't make assumptions

As external actors, we come into complex local situations which may not work as we expect. Any assumption that everyone agrees we have the authority to intervene or that our presence will be popular even with people we aim to help needs to be questioned. It is crucial to understand the situation in as much depth as possible: the culture, power relationships, vested interests, economic relations, values, gender relations, motivation and underlying causes of conflict. Do not assume that others will share our cultural assumptions or values about the best way to deliver public services, security etc. But also be wary of simple cultural assumptions about how 'different' or 'unsophisticated' local people are. Check what mechanisms are working and trusted, and what problems people see as needing to be addressed. Look at incentives and disincentives to find out why people are acting as they are.

No matter how great the imperative to act quickly, some time invested in achieving and maintaining this understanding will invariably generate significant returns. It will always be critical in achieving success and mitigating disaster. The earlier the process of analysis and assessment begins, the better.

Have a clear goal based on local processes, and work closely with others

The starting point is to understand how local and national actors can achieve a political settlement. All external activity should specifically support this. From the beginning, the external intervention should be as clear as possible about the locally rooted settlement it is trying to support. It should have a single strategic aim, to which all partners dedicate their efforts.

Political, military, humanitarian and economic recovery activities must support each other. Plans will not work if they are uncoordinated and contain untested assumptions about how other parts of the system will act and what they aim to achieve in relation to local processes.

Be patient and realistic about time and money

Experience has shown that lasting stability can take many years to achieve, and in many cases a military presence may be required for at least a decade. A realistic plan for sustaining the effort is required from the outset and it is important to manage expectations. A balance must be struck between making an impact quickly and being effective in the medium-to-long term. In doing so, objectives must be based on the priorities of national authorities and other local partners.

Adequate resources are required over long periods – almost by definition more than was originally envisaged.

Work with what is there – and use local knowledge for risk analysis

Wherever possible work with existing structures and systems, including civil society and informal social structures, no matter how imperfect. Try to help these operate as well as possible, but be careful not to impose Western-style technical 'fixes', no matter how urgent they may seem. They may not fit with local ways of working. International actors cannot decisively determine whether stabilisation will work, but national and local political and administrative institutions can. Knowing the local context will make you aware of those institutions that have real constituency support and those which are only nominally representative.

It is also important to check for unintended harm by anticipating the possible consequences of risky decisions and looking out for activities that could undermine other parts of the strategy. It is worth investing time in risk analysis based on astute local political knowledge. Rural communities, women, youth and marginalised groups such as IDP (Internally Displaced Persons) or refugee populations will have something important to say about what the society really needs for stabilisation and how you can make sure that your objectives are aligned with those of the affected population.

Learn and adapt

Few plans, however well formed, remain relevant to fast changing situations without adaptation, especially in unpredictable post-conflict environments. External actors will need to learn as they go along, and local politics can change quickly. Plans and decision making structures need to be agile and able to adapt to what we learn.

Be prepared to talk to unpalatable political groups and 'spoilers'

The political process may necessitate talking to members of groups that are unpalatable or politically undesirable. Spoilers – those who are undermining stabilisation activities and may be a threat – need to be dealt with, and their impact minimised. This might be done militarily, or through political or economic negotiations. Experience shows that many spoilers are open to reconciliation; a sophisticated understanding of their motivations is needed. Today's spoilers may be tomorrow's leaders. The problems are unlikely to go away until longer-term solutions are found, so persistence will be needed. At the same time, there may be political and legal constraints on including certain individuals or groups (for example those charged with international crimes) in dialogue or negotiation. In practice, a balance of military, political, judicial and other measures may need to be formed to include such actors where possible, and neutralise them or bring them to justice where not.

Analysing, assessing and planning

Assessing the UK's interests and role

Before intervention – what does the UK have at stake?

When the UK's intervention in a conflict is first discussed, the starting point will be assessing what interests the UK has at stake, and what legal and political mandate it has. In some countries a range of interests may come together to make a compelling case – such as those which involve development, regional interests, terrorism, migration, strategic military and economic interests and historical links to the UK. In other countries the interests may be much stronger for some British Government departments than for others. Reconciling these interests and finding what they have in common is often the first important step towards integrated planning.

Is intervention necessary?

Even if the interests are strong, the international community may have effective capacity already in the country. When a crisis occurs this may only need reorientation rather than significant supplementation. Sending a new stabilisation mission is far from the only response.

Success depends on the UK working with others

The effectiveness of the UK's strategy and plan depends on how successfully it supports the country's own national and local political plans, and on how well it works with other international plans (from the UN, NATO, the EU, and coalition partners).

Understanding the territory and assessing the conflict

Every situation is different: planning is impossible without assessment

External stabilisation interventions aim explicitly to change local dynamics. Having a sound assessment of the situation is crucial in providing a basis on which to plan our activities – whether for a large-scale UK operation or for a smaller intervention within a bigger international effort. Activities need to be based on a clear understanding of the causes and dimensions of instability, as well as on the challenges (in-theatre and internationally) of all types: operational, organisational, institutional, social, economic and political. Every situation is different, and even situations that are superficially alike may differ in ways that make similar approaches inappropriate.

How to conduct conflict assessment and find good analysis

There is a great deal of guidance available on conducting conflict assessments and thus no shortage of methodological approaches and tools. For more details, see the Recommended Reading section for this

chapter in Appendix 3. In practice though, there is rarely enough time for assessment and analysis, so it may be necessary to apply a 'rough and ready' framework for analysis to fit the time available. The second Stabilisation Note Stabilisation: A Matrix of Possible Tasks contains outlines of such frameworks for key problems and organisations. It almost goes without saying that assessment and analysis must be reviewed regularly.

Completing good analysis need not be too onerous. Gathering highly knowledgeable people in workshops or seminars can be a way of drawing many years of knowledge together into a deep analysis in a short time. Where possible, enable and use local analysis by people trusted across the relevant communities. One essential is that the conclusions of analysis and assessment are shared (if not always agreed). Collaboration in assessment is the best way of ensuring this – with local agencies and with other international actors.

Guidelines for assessment are set out in the following boxes. These are the 'ideal' – to be aimed for, while recognising that there will rarely be the time or information available to complete the full analysis.

At-a-glance: the ideal assessment process

1. Map the underlying causes of conflict

These include political, security, social and economic causes at all levels: local, national, regional and international. Separate symptoms from causes, and consider issues that cut across several areas (e.g. human rights, regional disparities, land disputes, communications, gender, environment, HIV/AIDS). Recognise how the conflict affects different groups, depending on age, gender, social grouping and religion. Also look at how these factors affect the conflict.

2. Map the actors

Who are the main parties in the conflict? Who is involved, directly or indirectly? Understand their interests, relationships, capacities, agendas and incentives. By intervening, the UK itself becomes one more interested party and its role should be clearly understood. We are never a neutral player in a local context and will never be perceived as such. We are one among many sources of influence and therefore must have a very good idea of the dynamics and forces that will emerge when the situation changes and how our presence will affect them.

3. Map the interest groups

For each group, we need to understand in detail: what it needs to survive and prosper; why it might (or might not) be more interested in peace than violence; what really influences the way its decisions are made; what room for manoeuvre it has, given its sources of power; why it would or would not accept the right of a particular group to represent the state; and what influence we may have on it, and why. Analysis of interest groups must not include only formal authorities. Real power may be exercised by traditional, illicit or economic groups alongside or instead of statutory authorities. These may include groups that we find politically unpalatable or difficult to understand, or whose authority derives from tribal, religious or ideological allegiance. They may also include groups that hold different kinds of power or influence, such as market women's organisations or youth societies.

4. Map the institutions

What institutions (organisations, legal and political frameworks, formal or informal structures) exist to deal with conflict and mediate interests? Are any of these working? What are the pressures on them and where do they come from? What is there to build on? Are there other institutions that could be used for stabilisation, such as line ministries or national NGOs (particularly women's organisations)?

5. Catalogue previous and current responses to the instability

What responses have there been, for example from local people, the government, neighbouring countries and the international community? What effect did these responses have? Listing them helps to avoid repeating past mistakes, and points to approaches that may have more success.

6. Describe future scenarios

This will help to identify the different ways in which events may unfold, and possible responses, allowing you to recognise risks, identify mechanisms for monitoring trends, and understand better the resources required to make a difference. Identify what type of peace is possible or desirable, as well as a likely timeframe for achieving it.

7. Identify priorities for stabilisation planning

When doing this, note the possible risk of worsening the conflict, and be practical in addressing the security situation, access and logistical issues.

At-a-glance: illicit power structures

The US Agency for International Development (USAID) is developing an approach to analysing what it calls 'illicit power structures'. These are non-state actors that challenge, within a certain area, the state's core function of monopolising the legitimate use of physical force. This approach examines powerful groups through five 'prisms':

World view

The way the group's leaders see the world, the way they want it to be and their organisation's place in it. Some groups' world view and associated interests can be reconciled with the rule-based systems of states, while some challenge the basic premises of those systems.

Motivations

The main motivation of some groups may be greed. For others it may be political or economic grievances ('need') or belief and identity ('creed'). There may be different motivations for the top leadership, mid-level commanders, rank-and-file members and sympathisers.

Methods

Groups may exert power by various methods, including violence, ideology, bribery or other incentives.

Structure

Groups may be either hierarchical (with top-down leadership and decision-making) or networked (loosely structured with multiple leaders).

Resources

From where does the group get its financial resources (e.g. a state sponsor, a diaspora, the exploitation of natural resources, or criminal activities)? How easily can the group replace a lost resource, and what are the likely implications for the evolution of the group and the conflict?

Practical steps: creating an Integrated Stabilisation Plan

Planning is complex but vital

We know that planning short-term military activities first and stabilisation activities second and separately will undermine our chances of giving successful support. Strategy and operational plans for external intervention have to be integrated and based on the best possible knowledge of an unstable situation.

A Plan can take many forms

The Stabilisation Unit has produced The Quick Guide to Stabilisation Planning (see Appendix 3), which suggests how plans can be formulated. However, the level of detail and shape of an Integrated Plan can vary according to need: for example UK planning may be much simpler if we are part of a larger-scale operation or are providing very discrete support to local stabilisation processes.

The planning hierarchy

An Integrated Stabilisation Plan is the guide for any UK contribution to an intervention. It combines military and civilian elements, and supports local and international plans. Ideally, the Integrated Stabilisation Plan is drawn up in-country by a team representing all UK departments. There are two outcomes of a good planning process: a) the plan, b) shared understanding amongst the planners and stakeholders. For the latter outcome, it is critical that plans should not be drawn up by groups of experts who have no role in implementation, and then handed down to implementation staff. Figure 1, below, shows an ideal planning hierarchy.




Figure 1: The ideal planning hierarchy

An overall stabilisation strategy needs to provide key principles and desired outcomes from the intervention, without being too prescriptive as to how these are applied and achieved. Here, the stabilisation aim is broken down into stabilisation objectives, which lead in turn to operational outputs.

A key function of stabilisation planning is to ensure that specific activities amount to the achievement of the strategic aim, through delivery of operational outputs and objectives. An Implementation Plan can go into more detail about operational objectives, which are outcomes over a defined period, such as 6-12 months. Operational outputs are then defined to support each operational objective. Lastly, activities are defined to support each output. This process brings the right people in at the right stage, including those involved in implementation, and helps to ensure that everyone shares an understanding of the collective effort.

Existing UK departmental plans may have to be modified in line with the overall stabilisation plan, and every plan should be reviewed regularly.

Example: The Helmand Road Map (2008)

The Helmand Road Map provides an operational guide for the Provincial Reconstruction Team (PRT) and Task Force Helmand (TFH). It defines the practical requirements of the overarching UK strategy for Afghanistan, delivered through a flexible combination of military and civil effect. The Road Map establishes the framework within which the military campaign plan sits.

The UK's experience in Helmand suggested that delivering a political settlement requires us to concentrate on understanding and responding to local level dynamics and translating this into political settlements between local communities and the Government of Afghanistan. The Road Map therefore suggests how to stabilise key geographic areas by supporting dialogue and ensuring a level of delivery on the ground which is visible to people at local level and builds their confidence in government, creating an environment conducive to a political process that gradually consolidates the Afghan state. For a specific district to become 'stabilised' there needs to be in place a political settlement rooted in the population's belief that local and national political structures are more capable and responsive than any realistic alternatives offered by the Taliban-led insurgency. District and community based institutions must be viewed by the population as sufficiently credible and robust that 'concerns' are raised with them; that some resources pass down through them; that some public services are delivered by them; and that disputes can realistically be played out within, rather than outside, them.

In practical terms, this requires establishing and consolidating local governance structures and enhancing their capacity to draw down support from provincial and national level institutions so they can start delivering in response to community needs. The key will be the creation of sufficiently enduring local political settlements in enough of the critical areas, established at a pace that delivers both a sense of political momentum and a critical mass of support.

Monitoring and evaluation

One of the most difficult practical problems is finding out whether our activity is having an effect and what that is. Devising indicators is tricky, and by no means a science. This is particularly the case since, as in the case of Helmand (above), the changes we are looking for relate to the attitudes and perceptions of key stakeholders rather than more objectively verifiable indicators. However, simple monitoring and evaluation tools – such as logical frameworks which depict in one matrix the hierarchy from activities, through outputs and outcomes, to the goal – can help to tell us whether we are making progress towards our strategic objectives. It is vital to find ways of monitoring the effect we are having not just nationally or regionally but in local communities. Sometimes proxy indicators can be used: for example, the amount of travel along key routes may be a reliable indicator of people's sense of security. Involving local women and men in monitoring and evaluation ensures that relevant indicators are being used and that the plan has local support.

The plan must continually evolve

Stabilisation operations are by definition uncertain. They can be affected by changes in national interest (of the host nation, ourselves or our coalition partners), public attitudes (in the host nation or at home), weather or even natural disasters. Our plans must evolve with the situation. There must be continual testing and amendment, through regular and realistic reviews carried out by representatives from all departments drawing on the latest analysis. Plans should be flexible enough to allow quick decisions, giving us responsiveness and agility within an overall clarity of purpose.

PART 2 – ACTION GUIDELINES

Linking immediate action to long-term plans

Balancing short- and long-term considerations

In any stabilisation, there will be tough challenges that have to be tackled straight away. But we need to be careful to avoid taking actions that solve short-term problems but inadvertently undermine longer-term aims. The following are some suggested ways of managing these conflicting requirements, suggested by experience so far.

Substitute for absent state institutions – but have an exit strategy

Where vital state functions have broken down completely, international bodies may need to run them at first. This can mean anything from taking full responsibility for aspects of security to providing experts to help run the power generators or municipal water supplies.

However, we need to think constantly about how and when to hand these functions back. We need not wait until local people can do them perfectly – just well enough to relieve us of them. This approach applies equally to specific tasks and to government as a whole. This has a number of implications for our approach: finding or building local capacity to take control of state institutions may have to be an early programmatic priority; international stabilisation actors may need to design the level and manner in which they provide services in ways that can be realistically managed later by local institutions and available personnel.

When everything looks broken, prioritise

Most states coming out of violent conflict are extremely weak or in crisis. It can't all be fixed at once, so identify a small number of priorities and their sequence. The international community can then focus on support in these areas.

We need to support as a priority the development of a political settlement. International interventions must be 'with the grain' of any existing settlement, as long as this does not disregard basic human rights or involve repression and neglect of the interests of sections of the population. One core lesson is that political settlements are not possible without some basic government machinery, such as payment systems for soldiers and police, and some revenue generation to fund programmes.

Beyond the priority areas, such as security, many state functions will take time to re-establish. For these, it is better gradually to try to revive existing institutions and ways of operating. Developments from local

realities which reconstruct previously existing institutions are likely to be more effective than new systems imposed by outsiders.

Find out whom we can work with – and don't try to pick winners

Knowing whom to work with is particularly difficult where the UK has had little presence, or where new political influences have rapidly emerged, or where the UK is perceived as an interested party with its own agenda. Nevertheless, we need rapidly to work out who our allies are, and with whom we can work. The choice has to be shaped by the overall purpose of our involvement and is not open-ended.

It may be better to take an inclusive approach than to try to 'pick the winners' in post-conflict local politics – risky both for us and the winners we pick. There is also a danger of distorting or undermining local political solutions by associating ourselves too closely with a particular group. If we make the wrong choice, we can end up on the wrong side of a conflict. Local political alliances and settlements may emerge in ways which we find hard to predict, or assist. Working with marginalised groups (e.g. excluded tribal groups, women, lower-caste, youth) may help to identify real avenues for change, but has to be approached against an assessment of the effect on mainstream political partners.

No matter how inclusive the emerging political settlement, there may be powerful groups that want to continue the violence. They need to be dealt with, whether by force, mediation or incentives. Sometimes they can be persuaded into the political process, especially if there are potential economic gains.

Protect our own personnel

The UK Government has a 'duty of care' to its employees – a responsibility to its people, military and civilian, to keep them as safe as possible. This has to be a fundamental shaping factor in the UK intervention.

Instil confidence about peace – but make the right impact

Towards the end of a conflict there may be an opportunity to give the population confidence in momentum towards a peaceful solution by demonstrating changes for the better. This is often called a 'peace dividend'.

However, we should not be tempted into activity simply because of the pressure to seem to be doing something. For example, we may believe that building schools quickly will be a popular and useful measure, and realise only later that the real problem is recruiting and keeping teachers who will turn up and teach in an effective and professional way. New schools which operate badly might even make the situation worse. We have to ask those affected what the priorities are, and we have to make sure we are talking to the right people. For instance, women tend to

have more community information than men and children, and youth may have strong existing networks across ethnic or political divides. We need to test all actions by their contribution to ending violence and achieving a political settlement.

Tell people what we're doing – but let the state take credit and blame

For stabilisation activities to be effective they need time and resources, which requires public and political support in the UK. Telling people about our objectives and activities is an important way of generating and retaining this support. However, remember that claiming credit ourselves may be counterproductive for the country in which we are working. It can undermine people's faith in their state's ability to do useful things for them, which works against our longer-term objective of building up a positive relationship between state and people. It is also vitally important to let the state take the responsibility – and the blame. If we continually intervene, we may prevent it from learning from people's reactions to its mistakes. We need to let state institutions take as much responsibility as possible, as soon as possible.

Quick Impact Projects (QIPs)

Quick Impact Projects (QIPs) are one of the most commonly proposed but most superficially understood ways of beginning stabilisation. On the face of it, these are simply projects which do not take long to conceive and deliver, and which rapidly have a noticeable effect on the ground. They can include delivering basic services (such as water, health or education), improving employment opportunities or contributing to local security. In practice, a number of principles have emerged to ensure the maximum positive impact from QIPs.

General principles for using QIPs effectively

- **Be sure that QIPs do no harm**

Self-evident but not always observed. Badly designed or implemented QIPs can have unforeseen perverse effects – exacerbating local tensions, creating the impression of favouritism, or unbalancing local power dynamics. The knock-on effects of projects also need to be understood: improving one community's water supply can inadvertently damage another's.

- **Consult widely and encourage participation**

The process of identifying, designing, managing and implementing QIPs should be based on an understanding of local needs, capabilities and dynamics. This also helps to ensure that the project does not undermine local state-society relations. There is strong evidence that when communities have been closely involved in identifying needs and forming

projects, they have a strong interest in protecting the project and making it sustainable.

- **Make sure projects are sustainable**

Projects need financial and technical resources to maintain them. For example, how will a school function once the building has been constructed?

- **Link QIPs to wider or longer-term processes**

Linking small-scale local projects to bigger national or regional programmes can help to ensure that running costs are met and the project contributes to increased confidence in the government.

- **Get local organisations to implement QIPs**

Whenever possible, QIPs should be implemented by local organisations, whether profit- or non-profit-making. This increases the flow of money through local economies and provides employment for many who might otherwise be susceptible to other offers. It also improves local organisations' capacity, both technically (e.g. by introducing better construction methods) and organisationally (e.g. through advice on financial and project management).

State-building – the three elements

Stabilisation activity may take place outside the state, and many state functions can be carried out by non-state actors, such as traditional leaders administering local justice or local non-governmental organisations providing wells. However, after an intervention, only the state can take over core security and administrative functions from international bodies. This means that, even in the worst post-conflict situation, our fundamental task is to contribute to state-building.

State-building is always primarily determined by local dynamics – the relations between governments, local communities and economic interests. We need to prioritise and sequence our interventions according to the impact they have on these state-building dynamics. Recent analysis by DFID suggests that state-building depends on three elements.

Evolving a political settlement

Political settlements, however tentative or fragile, have to incorporate the interests of groups who have the power to destabilise state institutions. International actors may undermine the emergence of a settlement by developing parallel structures or by cutting deals with some groups to the detriment of others. Alternatively, they may aid its emergence by supporting political processes, for example by helping to find solutions to contentious issues like land rights.

Ensuring the effectiveness of the state's 'survival' or 'core' functions

These vital functions are security (the ability to control, if not monopolise, the use of violence), taxation (the raising and effective use of money for public purposes), and the rule of law (the ability to make and apply laws, and be seen to do so).

Providing state functions expected by citizens

These may include such varied services as health and education, fuel and electricity for government and businesses to function, or an efficient postal service to allow money to be remitted from the cities to the countryside. The essential characteristic is what citizens want and we should not jump to conclusions about what people want and need.

When these three elements work together over time, a virtuous circle emerges.




Figure 2: The virtuous circle produced by the three elements of state-building

Experience: what we know about state-building

Experience and research has produced this advice:

Invest in understanding local power relations – this will allow you to invest in relationships with a broad set of local actors.

Prioritise and sequence – avoid overloading the reform agenda with competing, supply-driven initiatives.

Support emerging political settlements – invest time and understanding in developing inclusive political settlements.

Support the state's survival functions – working on security is a must, as it is crucial to generating confidence.

Focus on overall impact – all international interventions affect state-building, even if unintentionally, but focus on their cumulative effect.

Look beyond the state – state-building is about dynamic relationships between government and society, so help civil society and the private sector to articulate expectations.

Don't impose your own expectations – invest in finding out what the people really want and how that varies in different areas (e.g. urban and rural).

Engage women's participation – the needs and expectations of women and children can determine how institutions are perceived and whether they succeed.

Don't bet on the wrong elite – you may prefer to deal with those who share your language and values, but look at their real ability to mobilise popular support and generate confidence.

Don't confuse state-building with peace-building – state-building means increasing the capacity for peaceful cooperation, not simply repressing conflict.

The role of women

The UN Security Council's Resolution 1325 – on women, peace and security – calls for women's equal participation in all efforts to maintain and promote peace and security. It calls upon the UN and its member states to support local women in decision-making and resolving conflict, incorporating their needs and a gender perspective into all peacekeeping and peace-building initiatives, including elections and security system reform. UNSCR 1325 also calls on the UN and member states to take into account women's experiences in DDR processes and to ensure the protection of women and girls from sexual or gender-based violence. In negotiating peace agreements, it is particularly important that sexual violence is not condoned as part of any amnesty.

Women can have a crucial influence: for example on the success of reintegrating former combatants and their families, or in mobilising communities for peace activism. In stabilisation we need to find opportunities to engage women wherever possible, as well as supporting their activities and capacities. For instance, meeting with local women's organisations should be a routine part of all assessment missions. It

should never be assumed that women are taking part or have been consulted in stabilisation activities because 'community leaders' are present.

Promoting and observing human rights and humanitarian law

The primary responsibility for the protection of human rights lies with the national government. Abuses, be they human rights violations or violations of international humanitarian or criminal law, can jeopardise a country's critical path to stabilisation, either by eroding the population's confidence, by decreasing people's own capacities or by affecting donors' commitments. Justice for war-time atrocities is often a key demand of victims and their families. However, there can be a tension between bringing violators to justice and ensuring that the political process includes all groups who have the power to destabilise state institutions. This needs to be managed carefully: there is no easy answer.

Stabilisation assessment and planning should take proper account of both the UK's and the host state's obligations under relevant national and international law. Rights-based approaches contribute to stabilisation, provided that those who promote them have a good understanding of the state's actual legal obligations towards human rights, as well as of what the realisation of human rights can mean in the relevant national, legal and cultural context.

PART 3: TAKING ACTION – PRACTICAL TASKS

A menu of stabilisation tasks

This section looks at the main tasks involved in stabilisation. For a more detailed account of each task, please see the Stabilisation Unit's Guidance Note Stabilisation: A Matrix of Possible Tasks, available at www.stabilisationunit.gov.uk/ and also included in this document. The Matrix does not dictate what should be done, or in what order, but provides options from which choices should be made in both stabilisation planning and implementation.

Peace processes

The failure rate of negotiated peace settlements after armed conflicts is unacceptably high. We need to get better at fostering and supporting peace processes that transform conflicts and lead to durable political settlements and stable states.

Effective peace processes tend to:

- Include all the belligerents and the main political and social groups.
- Be comprehensive, addressing the issues that underlie this conflict and other inter-related conflicts.
- Limit external actors' role to providing strategic support – helping the parties involved to feel that they own the process and the agreements.
- Work on creating strong foundations rather than trying to find shortcuts to agreement, while being flexible enough to take advantage of momentum to reach a breakthrough.
- Support existing peace movements, including those conducted by women.
- Involve mutual strengthening between peacemaking efforts at the regional, national and local levels.
- Be multidimensional, enabling synergies between initiatives involving different stakeholders at different levels and using multiple methods.

In many cases, peace processes are weakened because they are signed without the consent of all parties (e.g. in Sudan, the Darfur Peace Agreement and North/South Comprehensive Peace Agreement) or without sufficient physical or economic security (e.g. in Liberia, the Accra Agreement).

Include all groups and consult widely

Broad consultation is the key to making peace processes inclusive, and no group or individual should be allowed to think they are outside the peace process. Not only elites should be involved – the roles of civil society and women's organisations are too often forgotten. External actors overseeing

the peace process should not be too prescriptive about its direction. At times tribal or religious leaders, or others with real positions of power, will play a key role in addressing issues in a more culturally acceptable – and therefore effective – way.

Make sure there is clear communication – for participants and people

Good communication is central to all negotiations because it helps to overcome suspicion that exclusive deals are being struck and to scotch rumours that distort participants' perceptions. Communicating the results of the process to the population is also crucial, as it can spread confidence that all sides are taking the process seriously and that it is producing results. For example, Radio Okapi, the radio station set up by the UN in the Democratic Republic of Congo, was very influential in helping the population understand and trust the outcomes of the Sun City and Pretoria transitional power-sharing accords.

Understand and deal with spoilers

There are two main ways to engage in spoiling (undermining the peace negotiations) – by systematically refusing to negotiate, or by entering into agreements and then reneging on promises. It is important first to seek to understand the intentions, motivations and capability of groups that are hostile to the process. Intelligence is crucial to this task, and analysts must ask:

- Does the group have limited demands that can be met by inducements?
- If not, can they be classified as 'total spoilers', unwilling to countenance limited or shared power and willing to use any inducement for their strategic advantage?
- Are they greedy, having goals that expand as the prospect of appeasement increases?
- How easy is it for the spoiler to be successful and still get what they want? Spoilers may pose a greater threat to peace when they can rely on the support of neighbouring countries and have access to valuable and easily tradable commodities.
- Are there other groups that can have influence (formal or informal) over the spoilers, such as traditional leaders?

Security and the rule of law

Achieving stability initially depends on security, which is crucial for enabling political dialogue, guaranteeing any peace and political settlements, safeguarding nascent economic growth, allowing humanitarian access and encouraging civil society to participate in rebuilding the nation. The most urgent priorities are often meeting public order and internal security needs and ensuring the basic functioning of the criminal justice system.

The stabilisation activities that this involves are different from Security Sector Reform (SSR) in more benign environments. They may include the provision of basic protection (including securing national boundaries) by the army or international forces; supporting essential administrative functions (such as paying and equipping the police); neutralising and managing the impact of adversarial groups, militias and other non-state actors; and facilitating political consensus on security sector roles and responsibilities.

Similarly, the rule of law is wider than the legal system.

"The rule of law governs the relationship between institutions in a state, and between those institutions and the citizen. It enables individuals to hold their state to account for respecting their human rights..., helps to manage disputes between individuals..., [and] provides a predictable business and economic environment that helps protect property and livelihoods, so contributing to sustainable development."

Foreign and Commonwealth Office, Strategic Priority 6

During conflict, the rule of law is usually eroded. During stabilisation, an important part of the political process is to rapidly improve the state's authority, competence and legitimacy by improving the rule of law. This can help give it credibility, allow political negotiation to proceed with fairness and accountability, and uphold the implementation of political agreements. The priorities will depend on the state's characteristics, capabilities and challenges, but the box below sets out what experience suggests they are likely to include.

At-a-glance: likely priorities in promoting the rule of law

Clarifying the national legal framework

This includes:

- The parts of pre-conflict law that apply (including informal codes and practices).
- A legal framework for international transitional administration or emergency legislation.
- The aspects of the legal framework that will (and should) remain uncertain until a permanent political agreement or constitution and subsidiary legislation are in place.
- Areas of pre-conflict law that are missing or that do not conform to international standards. Youth, juvenile and child justice is particularly likely to fall into this category, with potentially severe effects.

Establishing government structures

This means establishing or re-establishing structures that enhance capability, accountability, separation of the judiciary and executive, and oversight of the security sector.

Ensuring security mechanisms reinforce the rule of law

Establishing public order, meeting internal security needs and the basic functioning of the criminal justice system must all protect and reinforce the rule of law. This covers the actions of:

International military and peacekeeping forces – which should comply with international law and human rights standards.

Indigenous security and justice organisations – which should be under state control and conform to international law, the national legal framework and human rights standards.

Combating the assumption of impunity

Appropriate transitional justice mechanisms discourage and prevent human rights abuses.

Ensuring justice systems address land access and tenure

Over the medium term, civil and commercial justice systems need to function well enough to be able to address secure and fair land access and tenure. This applies particularly where there are large informal settlements or where people displaced by conflict are returning in large numbers. Be particularly aware of the gender and age aspects of land access and tenure.

Providing an investment, financial and regulatory framework

Depending on the length of time it takes to reach a permanent political solution, providing a strong investment, financial and regulatory framework could also be a stabilisation objective.

Guidelines for successful implementation

The key question is how to deliver these priorities. These guidelines for action are common to most aspects of stabilisation:

Reach a common understanding of the problem

It is tempting to address symptoms rather than causes. But training and equipment will not fix the problem if it is caused by fundamental political tension within organisations, fundamental disputes about resource allocation, weak allegiance to the state, or poor motivation stemming from poor pay, lack of vision or conflict fatigue. Support initiatives must start from a realistic shared assessment of the causes, so that these can be addressed first. This has been the lesson from Sudan and Sierra Leone,

where the protagonists have had enormously varying perceptions of the problems, which have had to be analysed in depth in exhaustive (and often repeated) peace negotiations.

Define and measure against outcomes, not inputs

Measures of effectiveness must be based on the security and justice outcomes achieved, not the activities that are carried out. This means looking at the whole range of organisations involved, not only those in the formal system. This includes religious hierarchies, traditional chiefs and judicial systems, and militias. Be realistic from the outset: some quick wins will be possible but organisational development takes years.

Think about coordination early

In security and justice, the coordination of activities is often poor: between the military and civilians, among international agencies, and between them and indigenous governments. Coordination is needed to avoid duplication, ensure that priorities are addressed, and make the best use of funding.

Accept that security is political, and factor politics into your plans

Political competition is greater in stabilisation environments because the 'established political order' no longer exists. There may be an interim political agreement, but access to power is fought over vigorously (or violently) until there is a permanent and enduring political settlement. Control of the security apparatus is a fundamental source of power, and therefore contestation.

"The security sector is the most closely bound to ruling elites and power structures; it is all about power relations, and to seek to reform it in any meaningful way is inevitably political and profoundly threatening to the established domestic order."

Yezid Sayigh, Security Sector Reform in the Arab Region, December 2007

Understand that organisations are interdependent

Focusing on security and justice outcomes usually means dealing with a wide range of interdependent organisations that must function collectively. For example, if the police force is improved but the capacity of detention facilities and courts is neglected, then the criminal justice system may be overwhelmed and conditions may rapidly deteriorate.

Encourage political consensus and strategic planning

In the complex security and justice sectors, ad hoc unrelated activities will not work. However, it is very unlikely that there will be a national strategy or a consensus on needs and priorities. In the short term, an informed judgement has to be good enough. But in the longer term, a national strategy is essential. Although it could take years for a strategy to be

developed, it might be possible to encourage the beginnings of a political consensus without distracting from the overall need for a political settlement. Basic support in establishing policy-making capacity would be a useful initial step.

Ensure expertise in managing change feeds into planning and implementation

To improve security systems requires skills in managing change and institutions. These skills are at least as important as operational experience. They ensure, for example, that expectations are managed and timetables are realistic.

Ensure quick impact, not just activity

Violence and lawlessness create a great deal of pressure to act immediately. In the past, this has sometimes led to quick fixes that, in the longer term, either did not work or were counterproductive. However, quick wins can be achieved, bringing immediate benefits without long-term harm. It is essential to consider what exists already, what the long-term implications might be and how they can be addressed. Another vital factor is visibility – ensuring that the local population can see improvements. For example, the renovation of Sierra Leone’s central court building in downtown Freetown was a visible reminder that the rule of law was being re-established.

Don’t focus only on formal state systems

In many places, ordinary people’s contact with formal state institutions – including those responsible for justice and security – is negligible or very negative. Policing may be absent, corrupt or predatory, and the formal legal system may be so expensive and inaccessible that most people never go near it. You may need to understand and work with traditional systems, such as customary justice or informal local forces. These may not function in ways that we would normally recognise or approve of, but they may be the only institutions that can and do reach the vast majority of the population. In Afghanistan, it is said that 94% of complaints are dealt with by non-state justice; in many African countries the estimate is 70-80%.

Disarmament, Demobilisation and Reintegration (DDR)

DDR is a high-profile activity frequently required for stabilisation, Security Sector Reform (SSR) and long-term development. Effective DDR means that ex-combatants remain unarmed, detached from their armed group, and integrated with society socially, economically and politically. DDR is often part of a peace agreement and ideally should be a state-led process.

Ineffective DDR programmes can undermine peace agreements, aggravate instability and inhibit development. DDR will fail if the potential participants feel insecure and are reluctant to give up their weapons. Any DDR programme also needs to take account of the roles of children and

women. It must also be remembered that DDR for child soldiers should happen regardless of the progress of peace processes¹. This is a specialised area and should be dealt with by the relevant agencies, including UNICEF and child protection NGOs, supported by donors.

Strategies and resources for the reintegration phase take a particularly long time to set up, so early planning is essential. In an immediate post-conflict situation, conditions may preclude a full DDR programme, though it may be possible to set conditions for DDR to take place in the future.

A DDR programme should ideally be:

- Part of a peace agreement, in the wider context of security-sector reform, including transitional justice and promoting the rule of law.
- Integrated with longer-term development initiatives.
- Based on effective reintegration.

Sierra Leone, Kosovo and Mozambique are all examples of more successful DDR programmes. Afghanistan and Liberia are examples of less effective DDR programmes that were politically manipulated and based on inadequate understanding of the context and political environment.

Governance: public administration capacity-building

For the state to fulfil its 'core' or 'survival' functions (described on page 29) it needs an administrative apparatus that functions in extremely difficult circumstances. Basic public administration is a prerequisite for economic recovery, security, justice, service delivery and many other stabilising activities.

Realistic aims

As we know from Western countries, getting public administrations to change and deliver is deeply challenging, taking years or even decades. Reviving or reforming public administration is a highly political activity. It is common in politically contested environments to use public appointments to cement alliances or reduce opposition. Power and resources may be managed as much for political purposes as for delivering services.

In stabilisation environments, a realistic aim is to support steps towards a 'good enough' public administration that is able to carry out some priority tasks, and to understand and pragmatically adapt to political constraints. The incentives those in power have to improve the administration's

¹ Paris Principles and Guidelines on Children Associated with Armed Forces and Armed Groups

functioning, and what their success in doing so depends upon, should be understood. Although it will often take a long time for an administration to function well, helping to make a start during stabilisation is essential to the withdrawal of the enabling external support.

Assessing public administration

Public administration support depends on carrying out an assessment of what needs to be done, in what order, by whom and how:

- What are the minimum or most critical functions that the government is expected to be able to perform?
- What is necessary (rather than desirable), feasible and acceptable to local partners, given variations in needs, capacity and resources?
- Which are the key actors and institutions responsible for performing these core or survival functions?
- What are the laws, rules, regulations, processes and procedures which regulate these key functions?
- What is the condition of the infrastructure relevant to these key institutions?
- Are there the financial resources for these key institutions to function and deliver basic services, and do they reach the places where they are needed?
- Are human resources adequate to ensure that key institutions function and deliver basic services?
- Is there a system for recruiting and managing staff? Are employees effectively rewarded for and/or sanctioned on their performance?
- What mechanisms are there for monitoring the performance of state institutions? Are they willing and able to take action?

Prioritising actions

Actions should be prioritised based on technical and political criteria. The first questions are 'What needs to work well enough?' and 'What are the areas for immediate attention?' Areas to focus on might include: the flow of funds through institutions (including the Ministry of Finance) to the ultimate users or beneficiaries; and the recruitment, management, training and motivation of personnel (perhaps through an independent civil-service management institution).

Where the political settlement is contested or weak, it may be impossible to insist on strictly rational and bureaucratic administrative systems. The political allocation of public sector posts and infrastructure funding may be critical components of political stabilisation.

Where visible quick wins are deemed important, it may be useful to invest in sectors or institutions where there is evidence of demand for reform and of immediate capacity to use what is provided. The visibility of improvements might be more important than their long-term strategic value. Examples are reopening historic bridges, the main law courts or

parliamentary buildings. Over time, though, other priorities will emerge. Establishing effective and fair taxation systems can be important not only for raising vital revenue for the state's functioning, but also for creating a 'deal' or 'contract' between the state and its citizens, encouraging citizens to hold the state to account.

All interventions need to be built on some foundation of existing capacity – even if that capacity is very low. Identification and planning of appropriate activities must be based on the question 'What is there to build on?' In some cases simple basic support is required – such as rebuilding and equipping priority government buildings, and ensuring that public service salaries are paid, especially those of health workers and teachers.

Transitional administrations

Transitional public administration arrangements can be set out in peace agreements. Transitional authorities or administrations are usually set up where the state and the international community need time to build up capacity and legitimacy for a longer-term political and governance solution. In these cases, the state may lack the capacity to exercise even basic functions.

The design of transitional administrations can be greatly improved by clear written arrangements, and agreement early on about the short-term outcomes required and what capacities already exist. The intention should be to keep international responsibilities as light as possible. To prevent the transitional administration from becoming permanent – which often happens – it is important to have a clear exit strategy and make provision for transferring responsibilities to institutions that have, in the main, been designed and built by the state itself.

Governance: corruption

Corruption undermines confidence in the state

One reason for focusing on administrative governance is to prevent corruption from undermining confidence in the emerging state, and robbing it of crucial resources for rebuilding. Corruption is often a manifestation of competition for power and control of resources, which is particularly acute in unstable environments. Anti-corruption measures are often the greatest threat to the powerful elites on whom the short-term political settlement depends. There is often a difficult judgement to be made about the timing of the pursuit of corrupt behaviour, since political deals may depend on a degree of patronage and opportunity for enrichment. On the other hand, failure to address corruption can contribute to a continued sense of injustice amongst those excluded, and damage the formation of a more durable political acceptance of the state.

The international community sometimes contributes to corruption

Sometimes the international community can unwittingly contribute to corruption. In order to achieve quick, visible results, there is often pressure to spend reconstruction funds rapidly. The emphasis on speed undermines attention to transparent procurement, quality control and contract management. Paying attention in the early reconstruction period to having a 'good enough' due process can establish new norms, helping to increase confidence.

The best way of tackling corruption

Experience has shown that 'showcase' anti-corruption initiatives (such as an anti-corruption commission with the power to prosecute) can help to deter 'grand corruption' if they can avoid becoming corrupt or politically manipulated themselves. The most effective route in the long term is usually to help establish effective systems of management and accountability, though in reality this takes a long time and is fraught with difficulties. Accountability might also include transparency, by means of media, civil society or political organisations.

Understand all the causes of corruption

The success of anti-corruption measures depends on having a sound understanding of the causes of corruption. Addressing a single cause (such as low salaries) without addressing others (such as there being little capacity to enforce the rule of law) will produce disappointing results. There are also complex and difficult issues of public expectation: in environments such as Mobutu's Zaire, Moi's Kenya or Abacha's Nigeria, was it considered corrupt to steal from the state to feed a family when the leadership was visibly doing so much 'accumulation'?

Governance: elections and other political institutions

Elections don't always contribute to stability and peace

Multi-party democracy is often seen as the end-point for a stabilisation or transition process. In some cases – such as in the Democratic Republic of Congo in 2006, Sierra Leone in 2002 and Burundi in 2004 – elections have provided an important focal point for progress. They can keep up political momentum for the movement from a transitional political settlement (such as one based on a peace agreement or a previous flawed or partial election) to government based on a popular mandate. On the other hand – as events in Zimbabwe in recent years and in Kenya in 2008 showed – elections can have a highly destabilising effect even in apparently stable environments, especially when they are flawed. The objectives of

stabilisation, including reaching a political settlement for sharing power between conflicting parties, may not be served by holding free elections.

Wherever elections are planned as part of a stabilisation process, their timing is crucial. There are plenty of examples, ranging from Haiti to Afghanistan, of apparently democratic elections, held as an early part of post-conflict peace-building, failing to secure that peace. A country's political balance can be very delicate, and elections – if they are held before confidence in their integrity has developed – can exclude parties to that balance, undermining it. Elections are most likely to be peaceful and lay the foundation for lasting peace if:

- Sufficient investment is made to ensure the integrity of the process.
- All entitled groups are included.
- Efforts are made to ensure the participation of marginalised groups such as rural populations, youth and women.
- There is adequate political space and freedom for debate.
- Politics has developed beyond interest groups vying for power and control of state resources.

Supporting parliaments and political parties

After successful elections have been held, the next hurdle is the effective functioning of the parliament returned. Parliaments can be destabilising if sessions are too short for legislation to be properly debated, if the ruling party railroads bills through, if ministers do not turn up to debates (whether or not they are members), or if a lack of basic resources prevents members from keeping in touch with their constituents. External support can help here, but only if ruling groups are prepared to respond to parliaments and play by the rules.

The development of political parties can have a vital role in the political arena, but it is difficult for external bodies to play a role in it. What, after all, is a political party: a formally constituted body or a charismatic leader's personal following? Caution and even-handedness are required, but they are often not enough to surmount the problems of identification and inclusion. Supporting the development of political parties should be carefully considered, perhaps through encouraging their participation in civic and voter education. Efforts should be made to ensure that equitable opportunities are given to people outside the traditional power-holding groups, such as ethnic minorities, youth and women, to participate and stand for public office.

The case for unelected assemblies

Sometimes, unelected assemblies of traditional, religious or militia leaders – or national 'notables' – can be more appropriate at the beginning of stabilisation. They have recognisable, powerful constituencies and can be convened quickly. The best-known example is the *loya jirga* in Afghanistan, and on becoming president of Southern Sudan, one of John

Garang's first actions was to call together the chiefs for a three-day meeting well in advance of the appointment (not election) of the first Southern Legislature.

Restoration of basic services, infrastructure and livelihoods

Basic services contribute to stabilisation

The delivery of key basic services should be part of the overall stabilisation strategy, because it bolsters the perception that peace is bringing benefits, helping a country move more smoothly from conflict to peace.

The provision of services by a new and still-fragile government – whether directly or indirectly – increases people's confidence in that government and can, in the medium term, contribute to its legitimacy and authority. Where services are paid for by broad-based taxation, the exchange of taxes for services is a critical component of the social contract – itself a critical component of stability.

The reconstruction of infrastructure and delivery of services can provide a quick source of local employment, and is especially important if the environment is still too risky for private-sector investment. And providing services for all can soften the grievances that sustain conflicts, and which are often fuelled by injustice or discrimination, real or perceived. Many Quick Impact Projects tend to focus on the provision of basic services for these reasons.

What to take into account

There are a number of factors to take into account, especially the tension between delivering quick, visible impacts on the ground and ensuring that services are delivered in a sustainable way, based on realistic assessments of capacity in the medium term. The key questions to be asked are:

- To what extent are basic services such as health and education currently being delivered?
- If delivery is patchy, how and why does it vary?
- What are the traditional roles of the state and the private or non-profit sectors in delivering services?
- What are the capacities of direct and indirect service providers, both current and potential?
- What obstacles are there to restoring basic services (e.g. security, infrastructure, geography, finance, administration, skills, technical factors, lack of equipment)?

- How can basic services be restored quickly without undermining sustainability in the medium term (3-5 years)?
- Can procurement of goods be done locally in order to boost the local economy?

Direct provision or building local capacity to deliver services?

In the absence of local capacity, it may be tempting to deliver services directly to the population in order to produce quick and visible 'peace dividends'. The risk is that direct delivery of services by external actors may simply create confidence in the external actors, with state/society relations remaining problematic. Wherever possible, it is therefore preferable to engage local agencies in service provision and to try and ensure that populations recognise the potential benefits of local government. Facilitating consultation on needs between populations and local government is essential to reduce mistrust and real or perceived inequalities in service delivery. A strategic communications campaign to inform perceptions will contribute to the stabilisation impact.

Think ahead to recurrent costs

It is also important to recognise that the delivery of services requires both an initial 'one-off' capital investment (e.g. reconstruction of a school) and ongoing recurrent costs to cover salaries, materials and maintenance. It is absolutely critical to consider how these recurrent costs will be met before engaging in capital reconstruction. A new school building which cannot deliver education due to lack of funds to meet running costs and salaries can in fact damage a population's faith in a better future. The local government budget should be taken into account. Where state resources are inadequate, mechanisms for cost recovery (payment for services) should be considered. External financial support should only be provided as an interim measure, and should be in line with the constraints that will affect the local budget once this is again functioning.

Inputs or impact

The 'effect' of service delivery on stabilisation and confidence in government should not be taken for granted. In the wake of conflict, confidence is at a premium, and populations may be surprisingly quick to misinterpret motivations. The adoption of a transparent and widely visible process of decision making is critical to avoid, for example, investments in one district being seen as a deliberate exclusion of the population of another. Constant monitoring of perceptions is critical, and enables action to correct such misinterpretations.

Economic incentives for stability

Jobs reduce the risk of a return to conflict

Economic initiatives, especially creating employment, have been shown to significantly reduce the risk of future conflict. Armed conflict tends to hurt the whole economy – rural and urban, formal and informal. This has a direct impact on the reintegration part of DDR. It is essential to ensure there are increasing numbers and types of jobs to facilitate stabilisation. Intensive vocational training and labour intensive reconstruction of public works are key elements in increasing opportunities.

Economies depend on social cohesion and are undermined by conflict

Economic activity thrives on trust, inclusion, exchange, cooperation and coordination, which stimulate entrepreneurship and attract investors. But in the aftermath of conflict, social cohesion is usually close to non-existent. Newcomers (refugees, IDPs, combatants), returnees (including ex-combatants) and victims of sexual violence and other war crimes have difficulty establishing their place in society.

Economic initiatives need to be based on analysis of the context, conflict and labour market. Not only economic but also political, security and social dimensions should be understood, to ensure that the initiative will have a positive impact on stabilisation. Special attention needs to be paid to the risk of socio-economic exclusion and of the economic benefits being monopolised.

The resumption of private sector activity shows people the effects of peace: shops reopening, basic food becoming cheaper, transport improving and getting less expensive, job opportunities increasing, basic infrastructure improving and potential tax revenues rising – all adding to the feeling of stability.

Private Sector Development (PSD)

The private sector is defined as *any person who sells something with the aim of making profit*. It therefore includes small-scale farmers and traders in the informal markets, as well as small, medium and large businesses.

The private sector can help ex-combatants and returnees to reintegrate: most of these people join the private sector as farmers or owners of micro-businesses, or are employed by them. The private sector can help stabilisation by providing apprenticeships and on-the-job training, and by including new entrepreneurs in their supply and production chains.

Boosting local economies is key to increased job opportunities. The procurement practices of both military and civilian international bodies can

have a direct and large impact on local PSD. Local procurement gives incentives to entrepreneurs and injects cash into the local economy. Simple tender processes, advance payments and a level of technical support can mean that local contractors are awarded work which increases local employment.

In stabilisation environments the risks and costs of doing business are often high. Improving security and restoring infrastructure helps to reduce these risks and costs. PSD opens up new peacetime economic possibilities, competing with the conflict economy – in which, it must be recognised, individuals and organised groups can benefit enormously. Most people, however, are less likely to become combatants if they can choose other employment. PSD can also reduce tensions between opposing groups (ethnic, political, factional or religious) as they are brought together to discuss their common goal of increasing business revenues and boosting local economies.

Boosting local economies

Analysing the constraints and opportunities of the locality is a first step towards developing an economic initiative. Rapid labour market analysis, assessments of existing natural and human resources and transportation links start to inform decisions on what is possible.

Quick Impact Projects (QIPs) can be a crucial tool in the re-energising of local economies. Examples might include rehabilitation of access roads (through labour intensive methodologies), restoring local irrigation systems, seed fairs, small-scale co-operatives, rehabilitation of market places, electricity generation. It is important to understand the local priorities and respond to these. The way an economic QIP is implemented may be as important as the end result; for example the use, where possible, of local labour and local contractors and offering training or mentoring.

Getting the strategic communication right

The UK's experiences in Iraq, Afghanistan and Sudan – along with experience from other post-conflict situations such as Bosnia, Kosovo, DRC and Angola – have emphasised the importance of strategic communication for stabilisation. It has three elements:

- Communicating the UK's activity to a UK audience – to sustain political support.
- Communicating the UK's activity to the host country – to gain local support for the UK's role.
- Communicating the host country's activity (by national and local authorities and communities) to the host country – to increase confidence in state institutions, which is the basis for a viable state and society after the UK leaves.

Strategic communication needs to integrate all three elements, which may occasionally be in tension with each other. Not only do the UK Government's objectives and activities need to be communicated to local and UK populations to sustain support for them, but the legitimacy and acceptability of a new political accommodation in the country depends on successful communication with the population.

This may mean helping to pre-empt likely insurgent or spoiler narratives that undermine stabilisation. In conditions of political uncertainty, rumour and misinformation thrive – helping to perpetuate that uncertainty – and trusted, impartial and consistent sources of information are in short supply. There is a wide range of stakeholders, and fragility and hostility make for intense politics – so there can be strong competition to take the political high ground by controlling communication.

In this environment, strategic communication has several components, including:

- Boosting telecommunications and media infrastructure (which can include technological capacity, legal frameworks and media development activities).
- Enhancing the provision of public information and the coordination of government messaging.
- Countering communications that undermine stabilisation, overtly or covertly.
- Researching attitudes (audiences) and monitoring behaviour change.
- Ensuring communications planning is part of other stabilisation activities, such as DDR.

Early planning and assessment of the capabilities of the host country, including its media, are vital. Having a communication plan and some means of implementing it will help other aspects of stabilisation work. Allocating adequate resources and time for this are crucial.

Local voices will almost always have more impact than foreign ones. The effectiveness of strategic communication comes from its local appeal and cultural relevance, so it requires a resolutely local approach. In practice, international staff can initially find themselves directing and managing communication activities if the host country does not have the capacity, but the sooner this activity is localised the more effective it will be.

APPENDIX 1

Resources for implementation

Funding and managing projects

In this section we discuss some of the ways in which stabilisation activities can be managed – as programmes, projects, or through other mechanisms. We also look at some of the current ways in which the UK, and the rest of the international community, can fund these.

Funding mechanisms and types of aid

UK projects can be implemented by a range of means, including:

- **Direct execution of a project** by UK officials or military.
- **Execution through contractors**, including NGOs, using UK-specific funds, possibly alongside an agency such as the World Bank or another multilateral financial institution (co-financing).
- **Pooled funding mechanisms**, whereby donors agree to put funds into a central pot and ask an agency – often the UN – to implement activities. These include Multi-Donor Trust Funds (MDTFs), and agency-specific trust funds such as the WB/UN International Reconstruction Fund Facility for Iraq.
- **Budget support** – money provided directly to a government’s overall budget, to be spent according to its own mechanisms and budget priorities.

Funding sources for stabilisation and early recovery

Possible funding sources are set out in the table below, though it is important to remember that not all of them are available everywhere. Knowing the possible sources and availability of funds is useful not only for funding particular projects but also for leveraging other resources vital to achieving key stabilisation objectives. This is particularly important if there is also an urgent humanitarian crisis or if stabilisation is slowly edging towards early recovery.

Like all funding sources, the UK’s have their own governance arrangements. Some funds are only accessible by NGOs and civil society organisations. Some are earmarked for certain uses, such as humanitarian assistance. And most funds have long lead-in times – so careful preparation is a good idea.

UK Government funds

Name: **Conflict Prevention Pool (CPP)**

Use: A comprehensive cross-government (MOD, DFID, FCO) programme of conflict prevention and management projects.

Comments: Until 2008, split into Africa and global (other).

Name: **Stabilisation Aid Fund (SAF)**

Use: Funds stabilisation interventions in particularly hostile environments. In 2008-9, Conflict Prevention Pool funding for Iraq and Afghanistan replaced by the SAF.

Comments: In principle, open to other countries which meet criteria, subject to ministerial approval.

Name: **FCO strategic programme funds**

Use: The FCO Global Opportunities Fund (GOF) aims to promote action on global issues in areas of strategic importance to the UK. GOF projects are intended to support one or more of the FCO's strategic priorities. The Public Diplomacy Fund (PDF) and the Drugs and Crime Fund (DCF) can also support stabilisation.

Comments: Currently being used in Afghanistan in counter-narcotics programmes, and to support counter-terrorism, economic governance, drugs and crime and human rights initiatives. See Afghan Drugs Interdepartmental Unit (ADIDU).

Name: **DFID funds**

Use: DFID programmes in particular countries aim to eradicate poverty or save lives, and can only be spent in accordance with the International Development Act (2002). Many stabilisation activities can be and are funded by DFID programmes, according to the strategic priorities of that programme.

Comments: Humanitarian funds are usually spent through the UN, NGOs and the Red Cross movement.

International funds

Name:	UN Central Emergency Response Fund (CERF)
Use:	The UN's central donation facility to help ensure that funds are on hand in time to take action in humanitarian emergencies.
Comments:	The fund is financed by voluntary contributions from public and private donors. Already, more than 50 nations have contributed to the CERF.

Name:	UN Peace-Building Fund
Use:	This aims to stabilise and strengthen government institutions, enhancing their capacity to sustain a peace

	process. The PBF focuses on the very early stages of a peace-building process.
Comments:	See www.unpbf.org . Recipients in 2007-8 include Nepal, Burundi, Liberia and the Central African Republic.

Name:	Multi-Donor Trust Funds (MDTFs)
Use:	MDTFs are administered by either the UN or the World Bank. They channel most funds for operating costs including civil service salaries, capacity development and public goods infrastructure.
Comments:	For the UN funds see www.undp.org/mdtf/overview.shtml . For the World Bank funds see www.worldbank.org , select Operations Manual and then a specific MDTF fund, e.g. Sudan.

Name:	WB Post-Conflict Funds (PCF)
Use:	These are quick and flexible disbursing mechanisms designed to support planning, piloting and analysis of ground-breaking activities in post-conflict environments, and support early policy reform and state-building.
Comments:	See above – these funds are also available for early recovery.

Name:	UNDP/Bureau for Crisis Prevention and Recovery Thematic Trust Fund
Use:	Aims to reduce the impact of natural disasters, prevent armed conflicts and aid recovery from crises. Supports projects under the service lines of conflict prevention and peace-building; recovery; SSR and transitional justice; small arms reduction; DDR; mine action; and natural disaster reduction.
Comments:	See www.undp/cpr . It appears to be very flexible in application and increasingly targeted at early recovery.

(Adapted from Nicole Ball's 2007 book Financing Mechanisms for Post-Conflict Reconstruction.)

Coordinating people, skills and organisations

Whose job is stabilisation?

The Stabilisation Tasks Matrix (available at www.stabilisationunit.gov.uk) sets out the range of potential tasks in stabilisation, and attempts to define when a task would need to be carried out by the military or by civilians. It proposes that some tasks should only be carried out by civilians, and some only by the military; others might be implemented by the military with direction from a civilian expert. The basic principle is: 'as civilian as possible, as military as necessary'. The allocation of responsibility depends in part on the 'permissiveness' of the environment.

Permissive environments

Permissive environments are secure enough to allow the deployment of civilians in the majority of tasks. The military and, to a much lesser extent, the police are still required for their specialist roles, but the main deployments are civilian stabilisation advisers and specialists.

Non-permissive environments

Non-permissive environments are assessed as too dangerous for civilians to move around in freely. Civilian stabilisation advisers can work in these conditions with protection (from the military or private sector close protection) and with constraints on their movements (such as working from a compound with a limited ability to move outside with armed protection). Often their role might be helping to draw up strategies and deliver tasks essential to stabilisation. These can be implemented by the military if they are the only personnel able to operate.

The military

Stabilising a crisis is impossible without adequate security and the provision of a permissive environment. The core role of the military in stabilisation is to maintain, restore or establish an enduring safe and secure environment to enable non-military stabilisation efforts. Military activities include providing security and control, contributing to security sector stabilisation activities, and providing a safe environment for governance and restoration of essential services. The military has a number of dedicated civil-military (CIMIC) advisers, whose role is to make contacts with civilian populations; the construction and supervision experience of the Royal Engineers is often transferable; and in the Reserve Corps the military may have many skills which are very useful for stabilisation. Most military, however, have no specific expertise in non-military stabilisation activities. The extent to which any additional skills should be developed to support a civilian lead in a hostile environment is under active consideration.

Stabilisation advisers (SAs)

These are experienced specialists in various fields who define operational strategies which are then often taken on by others for implementation. In most stabilisation tasks, SAs are civilians, but in a few fields they could be military or police. Their main distinguishing characteristic is lengthy experience in conflict situations and a demonstrated ability to understand complex environments and problems and to define realistic strategies and policies to achieve stabilisation. The Stabilisation Unit has a roster of trusted and experienced 'deployable civilian experts' (DCEs), who can act as stabilisation advisers. They can deal with any of the activities covered in the Taking Action chapter of this guide, and much else besides.

Police

Civilian police are required in a number of vital roles in stabilisation tasks. Those with experience of strategy and organisational change, rather than purely of operations, are most useful.

Specialists


Specialists are available to undertake more specialised assignments or to be members of implementation teams. Their assignments vary in length but most last months or years (though not always continuously).

The UK's specialists are usually contractors working through other organisations:

- **Private companies and NGOs**, including firms engaged under existing framework agreements, firms selected by ad hoc competitive tendering, private security companies, and international NGOs (especially in the humanitarian field) that have agreed to work on stabilisation programmes.
- **UK public sector organisations** (e.g. Her Majesty's Revenue and Customs, the National Audit Office) which have organised for development work may also become 'contractors'. We sometimes provide opportunities to develop the capacity and skills of other UK Government staff by deploying them in stabilisation missions.
- **Other organisations**, such as UK local authorities or corporate members of the Defence Partners Scheme, may also be able to supply specific expertise.

What skills are needed?

Part 3 of this guide, on Taking Action, sets out some of the sectors (such as DDR or elections) in which stabilisation advisers and specialists need to be expert and experienced. This sector knowledge is a prerequisite, but there are two other types of skill that are at least as important in stabilisation.



Personal effectiveness

Stabilisation environments differ from other interventions in that what you do is sometimes less important than the way you do it. There are huge challenges in interpersonal relations and negotiations. Besides being experienced in their fields, personnel need to be adept at stretching scarce resources and influencing debate within the country and internationally. They need to be highly flexible and adaptable, understand stakeholders' issues and priorities, and work well in a team – all in very difficult conditions. They need to be able to communicate effectively and respectfully with men, women and children at all levels and from different parts of society. And they need to be resilient, and able to work at the pace of the fastest, normally the military.

Process skills

Process skills enable a consultant or official to apply their knowledge and personal effectiveness to the tasks likely to be needed in stabilisation. It is not enough to have worked in a sector, or to be a robust individual. Stabilisation advisers and specialists need to be able to understand and advise on a range of processes, whatever the sector they specialise in. The following skills may often be required across the stabilisation team:

Core skill	Indicators
1 Situation analysis	The ability to analyse political, economic, historical, conflict, cultural and anthropological factors.

2	Strategy and policy formulation	The ability to develop sector and institutional strategies and persuade other national and international parties.
3	Organisational analysis	The ability to analyse organisations, obtain and take into account key stakeholders' views, and draw up reconstruction/reform plans.
4	Financial analysis	The ability to identify and understand financial systems' key strengths and weaknesses, and to plan and implement reforms.
5	Human resources	The ability to assess and reform personnel management systems, and to present and sell reforms to decision makers and public servants.
6	Legislative analysis and drafting	The ability to appraise legislation for suitability, loopholes, inconsistencies and drafting quality.
7	Donor liaison and joint programme planning	Understanding the approaches, methods and likely priorities of other aid agencies (the UN, World Bank and other bilaterals).
8	Project and programme planning and management	The ability to plan, control, manage and monitor potentially large-scale reconstruction or reform programmes, both short- and long-term.
9	Selection and recruitment of key DCEs and contractors	The ability to draw up terms of reference for individuals or teams from overall programme objectives, and experience of appraisal.
10	Procurement	Experience of rapid, value-for-money procurement techniques and the ability to assess, monitor and troubleshoot performance in projects.
11	Whitehall processes	Understanding the positions and constraints of key UK Government departments, and the ability to represent the UK Government's interests and positions reliably and accurately.

How do we ensure practical planning and management?

The UK's experience of integrated stabilisation operations has highlighted some key considerations for managing operations day-to-day. Most are now covered by the Stabilisation Unit's Standard Operating Procedures (SOPs), which apply to all staff, as well as to other personnel deployed under the Unit's auspices. The SOPs cover deployment issues, quality assurance and staff issues, including welfare, rotation (breaks, R&R etc.) and managing local workers.

Field IT and communications are also crucial. Cross-government systems enable communications between London and deployed elements. Other required support for personnel includes complete deployable modules for over 20 people, which include logistics, communication and information systems, office facilities, sleeping accommodation, vehicles, power generation and distribution. The Stabilisation Unit is completing arrangements to make all of these available to move at 10 days' notice.

APPENDIX 2

What is the Stabilisation Unit?

The Stabilisation Unit, previously the Post-Conflict Reconstruction Unit (PCRU), is jointly owned by the [Department for International Development \(DFID\)](#), [Foreign and Commonwealth Office \(FCO\)](#) and [Ministry of Defence \(MOD\)](#). It provides assistance in countries emerging from violent conflict where the UK is helping to achieve a stable environment that will enable longer-term development to take place.



The debris from years of violent conflict used to create a fence in Kabul

The Unit's key tasks

Assessment and planning

In a country emerging from violent conflict, the Unit helps UK Government departments and the military to develop a common understanding of the issues and plan together so that there is a single aim, a strategic framework and an integrated operational plan.

Deployments

The Unit provides experienced civilian personnel to work in insecure countries. They design and implement projects, such as to develop an effective police force, create jobs, or build the government's ability to plan for development.

Lesson learning

The Unit identifies and shares best practice, both in the UK and internationally, on how best to support countries emerging from conflict.



Villagers in West Nepal share their views on public security in the run-up to elections

What does the Stabilisation Unit offer?

The Unit's staff and consultant experts have a unique mix of skills:

Stabilisation expertise

This has been developed by their work in a wide range of difficult and dangerous environments.

An understanding of the UK Government and military

The Unit understands the approaches of the UK's three main international departments and of its armed forces. It is well placed to bridge cross-governmental issues and understands the challenges involved in collaboration between civilians and the military.

Capabilities in many disciplines

These capabilities include: designing programmes; restoring an effective security sector; advising on the development of local government; and improving the effectiveness of communications on the international community's support.

Where does the Unit work?

The Unit focuses on places that are emerging from violent conflict, that are UK foreign-policy priorities and that require close cooperation between an international military presence and civilian agencies in order to achieve greater stability. Its primary focus is on places where the UK military is significantly involved, but it can also support the UK's efforts elsewhere if it has the capacity.

APPENDIX 3

Recommended reading and websites

If an Internet address is not given, the item is not currently available online.

General

The **Stabilisation Unit's** website: www.stabilisationunit.gov.uk.

The **Governance and Social Development Resource Centre (GSDRC)** has information on governance, conflict and social development for the international development community. It is funded by DFID and has a section on stabilisation. (www.gsdrcc.com)

The **Ministry of Defence** has nearly all British military doctrine, including Joint Warfare Publications, Joint Doctrine Notes (JDNs), and selected NATO and Coalition publications.
(<http://www.mod.uk/DefenceInternet/MicroSite/DCDC/OurPublications/JDNP/>)

The UK **Inter-Department Glossary of Planning Terminology**
(<http://cawgterminology.pbwiki.com/Planning>)

Part 1 – Preparation

Understanding stabilisation

Steele, J., 2008, "Defeat: Why They Lost Iraq", IB Tauris, London

Ward, C. J., 2005, "The Coalition Provisional Authority's Experience with Governance in Iraq: Lessons Identified", Washington DC
(<http://www.iraqfoundation.org/reports/pol/2005/sr139.pdf>)

Humanitarian or stabilisation projects?

Slim, H., 2004, "With or Against: Humanitarian Agencies and Coalition Counter-Insurgency, Opinion", Centre for Humanitarian Dialogue

Dobbins, J., & Jones, S.G., & Crane, K., & Degras, B.C., 2007, "The Beginner's Guide to Nation Building", Rand Corporation

Analysing, assessing and planning

Stabilisation Unit, 2007, "The Quick Guide to Stabilisation Planning"
(http://www.stabilisationunit.gov.uk/information_stabilisation_unit.html)

DFID, 2002, "Tools for Development" Version 15
(<http://www.dfid.gov.uk/pubs/files/toolsfordevelopment.pdf>)

Stabilisation Unit, August 2007, "Stabilisation Issues Note: Critical Path"

Stabilisation Unit, 2007, "Joint Stabilisation Assessment (JSA) Overview" Working Draft (www.stabilisationunit.gov.uk)

DFID, 2002, "Conducting Conflict Assessments: Guidance Notes" <http://www.dfid.gov.uk/Pubs/files/conflictassessmentguidance.pdf>

FCO, "The FCO Conflict Toolbox"

Cabinet Office, 2005, "Risk Assessment and Strategic Analysis Process Manual, Prime Minister's Strategy Unit" (<http://www.cabinetoffice.gov.uk/upload/assets/www.cabinetoffice.gov.uk/strategy/5process.pdf>)

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Chr. Michelsen Institute (CMI) is an independent centre for research on international development and policy. (www.cmi.no)

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Abbreviations

CAF	Country Assistance Framework (UN)
CAF	Conflict Analysis Framework (World Bank)
CAS	Country Assistance Strategy
CCA	Common Country Assessment
CDA	Conflict-related Development Analysis
CERF	United Nations Central Emergency Response Fund
CIVPOL	United Nations Civilian Police
COIN	Counter Insurgency
CPR	Crisis Prevention and Recovery
CSO	Civil Society Organisation
DCE	Deployable Civilian Expert
DDR	Disarmament, Demobilisation and Reintegration
DFID	Department for International Development (UK)
DPA	Department of Political Affairs
DPKO	United Nations Department of Peacekeeping Operations
EC	European Commission
EU	European Union
HMRC	Her Majesty's Revenue and Customs (UK)
IC	International Community
IDA	International Development Association
IDP	Internally Displaced Person
IMPP	Integrated Mission Planning Process
JSA	Joint Stabilisation Assessment
JSSR	Justice and Security Sector Reform
MDG	Millennium Development Goal
MDTF	Multi-Donor Trust Fund
NAO	National Audit Office (UK)
NGO	Non-Governmental Organisation
OCHA	UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs
OECD DAC	The Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development's Development Assistance Committee
PBC	Peace-Building Commission
PBSO	UN Peace-Building Support Office
PCNA	Post-Conflict Needs Assessment
PSD	Private Sector Development
QIPs	Quick Impact Projects
SA	Stabilisation Adviser
TOR	Terms of Reference
TRF/TRM	Transitional Results Framework/Matrix
UN	United Nations
UNCT	United Nations Country Team
UNDAF	United Nations Development Assistance Framework
UNDG	United Nations Development Group
UNDG(O)	United Nations Development Group (Office)

UNDP	United Nations Development Programme
UNDP BCPR	The UNDP's Bureau for Crisis Prevention and Recovery
UNHCR	United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees
US S/CRS	The US Department of State's Office of the Coordinator for Reconstruction and Stabilization