

## Stabilisation Issues Note Disarmament, Demobilisation and Reintegration

### Purpose

Issues Notes provide a quick introduction to stabilisation issues for UK Government practitioners working on stabilisation. They point the reader to more detailed information and guidance. This Issues Note gives readers a basic understanding of Disarmament, Demobilisation and Reintegration (DDR), so that they are in a position to consider whether DDR is an appropriate stabilisation intervention in their country/region. It raises dilemmas and decisions that the practitioner will be faced with when considering a DDR programme. This note should be read in conjunction with “Post-Conflict Disarmament, Demobilisation and Reintegration: A UK View”, and with other Stabilisation Issues Notes, particularly those on Security Sector Reform and Economic Recovery.

### Key Messages

- Disarmament, Demobilisation and Reintegration (DDR) is a high profile activity frequently required for stabilisation, Security Sector Reform (SSR) and long term development.
- DDR can be implemented on a country wide, regional or area basis depending upon the nature of the conflict. Effective DDR means that ex-combatants are socially, economically and politically integrated with society.
- DDR can be highly political, and any adult DDR programme<sup>1</sup> must be part of a peace settlement and positioned within a process of political transformation. Ideally, DDR should be a state-led process. Ineffective DDR programmes can undermine peace agreements, aggravate instability and inhibit development.
- Although DDR is a widely-used stabilisation intervention, it is not appropriate for all situations. Indeed, in many countries despite huge expense, DDR has not resulted in sustainable reintegration of ex-combatants into society and in some circumstances, other programmes are more effective.
- DDR alone cannot prevent conflict from recurring; nor should it be viewed as the only mechanism to bring stability to a country after conflict. DDR is one part of a raft of complementary stabilisation interventions, including efforts to promote economic recovery, and broader security and justice reform. DDR should be informed by robust conflict analysis, including a gender analysis, to ensure that any programme does no harm.

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<sup>1</sup> DDR of children should happen immediately and not wait for a peace agreement. See below for more detailed guidance.

- DDR is a long-term process. Effective reintegration is vital. This takes a minimum of 2 to 3 years, and must be done in coordination with broader development and economic recovery activities and should be community-based. Planning for reintegration must start as early as possible, before disarmament and demobilisation starts, and sufficient resources must be made available.
- DDR programmes require the definition of eligibility criteria to regulate who will receive benefits. Eligibility requirements should be tailored to the objectives of the DDR process and the operational environment in which they are implemented.
- UN Security Council Resolution 1325 commits the international community to consider the different needs of female and male ex-combatants in the planning for DDR.
- Child disarmament, demobilisation and reintegration need to be systematically incorporated into DDR, guided by the Paris Principles and Guidelines, as well as the Optional Protocol on the involvement of children in armed conflict to the Convention on the Rights of the Child. Child recruitment and use in armed conflict is always a violation of child rights.

## What is DDR?

2. The objective of the DDR process is to contribute to security and stability in post-conflict environments so that recovery and development can begin. The DDR of ex-combatants is a complex process, with political, military, security, humanitarian and socio-economic dimensions. It aims to deal with the post-conflict security problem that arises when ex-combatants are left without livelihoods or support networks, other than their former comrades, during the vital transition period from conflict to peace and development. Through a process of removing weapons from the hands of combatants, taking the combatants out of military structures and helping them to integrate socially and economically into society, DDR seeks to support ex-combatants so that they can become active participants in building peace.

3. In this regard, DDR lays the groundwork for safeguarding and sustaining the communities in which these individuals can live as law-abiding citizens, while building national capacity for long-term peace, security and development. It is important to note that DDR alone cannot resolve conflict or prevent violence; it can, however, help establish a secure environment so that other elements of a recovery and peace-building strategy can proceed.

4. The three constituent activities of DDR, plus 'reinsertion', are defined as follows:

**Disarmament** is the collection, control and disposal of small arms, ammunition, explosives and light and heavy weapons of combatants and often also of the civilian population (UNDDR, 2007) It also includes small arms management programmes. Disarmament in war to peace transition is a symbolic test of commitment of all parties to the peace process.

**Demobilisation** is the process by which armed groups (government and/or opposition or factional forces) downsize or completely disband, as part of a broader transformation from war to peace. Typically, demobilisation involves two stages:

- (i) Processing individual combatants in temporary centres or designated camps (cantonment sites, encampments, assembly areas or barracks) where disarmament may occur if it has not already occurred. At this stage identity data is collected, and there may be needs/capacity assessments of former combatants; and
- (ii) Providing reinsertion support, i.e. short term material or financial assistance to help cover the basic needs of ex-combatants and their families for up to a year after demobilisation. This can include transitional financial allowances, food, clothes, shelter, medical services, short term education, training, employment and tools. Demobilisation might also include repatriation or return to places of origin.

**Reinsertion** is short-term material and/or financial assistance offered to ex-combatants during demobilisation, but prior to the long-term process of reintegration. Reinsertion packages can include short-term allowances, food, clothes, shelter, medical services, short-term education, training, employment and tools.

**Reintegration** is the process by which ex-combatants acquire civilian status and gain sustainable employment and income programmes. They provide ex-combatants with opportunities to increase the potential for their (and their families') economic and social reintegration into civil society. Reintegration involves an open time frame, primarily taking place in communities at the local level. Reintegration programmes can include: psycho-social support; vocational training; job placements or apprenticeships; business start-ups; micro-finance; and other income generating activities. Reintegration programmes also support communities and are complemented by other recovery and development initiatives which boost local economies to enable them to absorb ex-combatants.

## **DDR and stabilisation**

5. Stabilisation is about ending or preventing the recurrence of violent conflict, and creating the conditions for normal economic activity and non-violent politics. Stabilisation usually requires external joint military and civilian support, a focus on the legitimacy and capability of the state, and tangible benefits to the population to underpin confidence in the state and the political process. There is no predetermined period for stabilisation, with some countries undergoing this phase over many years. Stabilisation can be broken down as support to countries emerging from violent conflict to:

- Prevent or reduce violence;
- Protect people and key institutions;
- Promote political processes which lead to greater stability; and
- Prepare for longer term non-violent politics and development.

In some stabilisation situations, outsiders also need to be prepared to play an enforcement role even in the absence of a peace deal, often taking on an insurgency. In these situations, combatants are unlikely to be willing to disarm, and forced disarmament is unlikely to be sustainable.

6. In the immediate aftermath of violent conflict, former combatants pose a serious challenge to peace and security. DDR is often seen to make a more tangible contribution to stability than other stabilisation activities because of its explicit objective to demobilise ex-combatants and return them to civilian life.

## **DDR and women and children**

### **DDR and Women**

7. It is increasingly recognised that women comprise a significant part of armed forces and armed groups. As well as being directly involved in fighting, women perform essential support functions such as portering, washing, cooking and child-care, and they are often kept in armed groups as sexual objects. Women are often invisible in DDR programming except as dependents. This can be because the programme is not relevant to them, they go elsewhere for their needs (such as to reproductive health services) or they do not know that they are eligible for the programme. Programmes where the identification of eligible group members depends on lists provided by commanders may miss out women ex-combatants.

8. International law and standards state that women should not be discriminated against on the basis of their sex – including in the delivery of assistance such as DDR assistance. UN Security Council Resolution 1325 also specifies that DDR programmes should take account of the different needs and experiences of women and men. DDR programmes need, therefore, to reflect the presence of women associated with armed forces or groups in whatever capacity. This will mean designing and planning DDR programmes that are accessible and relevant to women and girls, encourage them to present themselves and do not address them only as dependents of male fighters. The best way to find out what women need and how to make the programming relevant to them is to ask them, either directly or through other women.

9. Particular consideration should be given to the impact of reintegration of women and children. Box 1 highlights the unforeseen impact of DDR reintegration packages on women in Afghanistan.

#### **Box 1: Impact of DDR on women in Afghanistan**

There has been no attempt to understand the impact of DDR on women, but there are clear negative effects on households. First, as former combatants are often left waiting at home for several months for their reintegration packages to start, stresses on the relations within the households and wider support networks increase. Secondly, women and children often had to care for fields and livestock whilst their husbands were attached to their armed units. Now, the units have been disbanded men are not necessarily taking on these tasks again and women and children continue to do much of the work. The benefits of the programme, such as the provision of animals or seeds, often means an increase in women's workloads without corresponding increases for the men who are supposed to be the beneficiaries.

Source: (2006:4) Rossi, S and Giustozzi, A Disarmament, Demobilisation and Reintegration of Ex-combatants in Afghanistan: Constraints and Limited Capabilities. LSE Crisis States Research Centre.

10. DDR programmes should ensure that women in communities are not excessively burdened by having to cope with returning combatants and their dependents. For instance, asking women in the community what would be an appropriate reinsertion package can avoid making mistakes that lead, for instance, to an upsurge in prostitution and other violence against women. It can also help ensure that the community benefits from the return of ex-combatants, easing their reintegration

### **DDR and Children**

11. The recruitment and use of children in violent conflict is a violation of international human rights and humanitarian law. It is contrary to international law for armed groups to recruit or use children under 18, and recruiting or using children under 15 is a war crime. Nevertheless, internationally about 250-300,000 children are used by armed forces and groups. They may be engaged in active combat or perform essential support services such as pottering, weapons maintenance or cooking. Girls and boys may be used as 'sex slaves'. Many girls will have babies as a result of rape while with the armed group. It is up to armed forces and groups to ensure that no children are in their ranks.

12. Because child recruitment and use is always a violation, their DDR should not wait for a peace agreement or be dependent in any way on the progress of adult DDR programmes or SSR. Even while the conflict is raging, no effort should be spared to get children out of armed forces and groups.


13. Where there are parallel child and adult DDR programmes they should be harmonised so that children are not put at a disadvantage because of their age and so that young women and men who were recruited as children can be catered for appropriately. Where children are demobilised along with adults, they must be separated at the earliest opportunity and they must be disassociated from the command structure of the armed group. Attention must be paid to children's particular needs, for example family tracing and reunification, psycho-social or health needs. Cantonment is not suitable for children and they should be transferred as soon as practicable and safe to alternative care facilities, then home whenever possible. Cash payments should never be made to children.

14. Child DDR is complex and carries its own sensitivities. UNICEF and its child protection partners have many years of experience in this regard and their lead should be followed. The Paris Principles and Guidelines on Children Associated with Armed Forces and Armed Groups provide comprehensive guidance on children's DDR.

## **DDR Resources and Actors**

### **Costs of DDR**

15. DDR programmes are expensive and there is often a significant difference between the proposed budget and the amount actually available. Figure 1 gives an estimate of the costs of DDR programmes undertaken since 1995. DDR takes place in dynamic environments where situations change and flexible funding from donors is essential. Typically, donors contribute to trust funds for DDR, managed by the UN or World Bank. In stabilisation situations where individual donor countries are very active, these donors may contribute the majority of resources and manage them in direct partnership with the national government. Commitment by donors to reintegration assistance, including creating an enabling environment for reintegration, is usually insufficient. Costs of DDR are often calculated on a per ex-combatant basis, and initiatives to increase opportunities in the community, such as through employment creation, are under funded.



Source: Analysis of DDR programmes in 2005, Albert Caramés, Vincenç Fisas and Daniel Luz, Escola de Cultura de Pau, Feb. 2006 in HMG (2006) Post-Conflict Disarmament, Demobilisation and Reintegration: A UK View.

## DDR Actors

16. The UK supports, but does not directly implement a number of DDR programmes including in Afghanistan, Sudan and the Great Lakes. The UK has a particular interest in DDR when UK troops are in theatre. As the UK will be one of several actors involved in DDR, planning must involve coordination and task allocation between partners. Where the UK has been actively involved in the conflict as a fighting force, there may be legal constraints on certain aspects of its involvement in DDR.

17. The overall management and co-ordination of a DDR programme is usually undertaken by a national commission or authority. The national commission should be representative and involve all key actors where possible.

18. The main international DDR actors are the UN and the World Bank. Bilateral donors often support these multilateral institutions. For example, the Multi-Country Demobilisation and Reintegration Programme for 9 countries in the Greater Great Lakes Region are managed by the World Bank and UN, with donor countries offering funding and advice.

19. The UN's Interagency Working Group (IAWG) on DDR involves representatives of 15 UN agencies, including Department for Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO), United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) and the United Nations Children's Fund (UNICEF). Regional organisations, such as the EU, OSCE, ECOWAS and the AU have also been involved in DDR programmes. There can be considerable competition between international organisations mandated to undertake DDR. In most DDR programmes, NGOs act as implementing partners for the reintegration component.

20. Peacekeeping missions often have a major role to play in DDR. The DDR components of peacekeeping missions work closely with the military and police components. Early DDR requirements are factored into both military and police planning processes such as force generation and security assessment. The military can contribute to DDR in the provision of security, gathering and distribution of information and the technical aspects of disarmament. In addition, military capabilities can be used to provide various aspects of logistic support, including camp construction, communications,

transport and emergency medical assistance, if spare capacity is available. The relevance of policing to DDR is two-pronged: crime control, law and order, and security; and police reform/restructuring in the post-conflict period.

## **Dilemmas and Decisions**

21. This section highlights some of the key issues to consider when considering a DDR programme as a stabilisation activity.

### **Ensuring DDR is appropriate to the context**

22. DDR programmes are often one of the first forms of international assistance in stabilisation contexts. Yet their design and implementation can be complex. Few have been judged to be wholly successful; few impact assessments have been conducted; and in some cases there are doubts as to whether DDR should have been undertaken at all. Before embarking on a DDR programme, it is essential to consider whether DDR is appropriate to the political, economic and security context in the country or region, and what level and nature of resources will be required to make a sustainable impact.

23. Often, DDR programmes fail because of insufficient understanding of the local context and culture. For many potential beneficiaries of DDR, disarmament equates to surrender or being fired. Therefore, DDR as a term can have unfortunate connotations. In such circumstances, it may be helpful to talk about *arms management* or *decommissioning*, or promoting alternative livelihoods.

### **Linking DDR to a peace agreement and political transformation**

24. In the aftermath of conflict there is usually pressure to commence DDR as soon as possible. DDR planning should commence during, rather than after peace negotiations, and peace settlements should ideally outline the broad aims of DDR, giving particular attention to how DDR will be undertaken, who will benefit and over what timeframe. A dilemma may be that difficulty to agree such detail may dissuade parties from signing up to a peace settlement. Conversely, if DDR is not covered by a peace settlement, parties could, with some justification, claim that they did not sign up to the details of the DDR programme. Achieving the right balance is difficult; the earlier these discussions start, the better.

### **National ownership and leadership of DDR**

25. National actors, including national governments, the former armed opposition and members of civil society, should assume leadership and responsibility for decisions about objectives, policies, strategies, programme design and implementation modalities. Ideally, the state should lead DDR, but its role has to be balanced by its often inadequate institutional and administrative capacity to deliver, as well as potentially questionable legitimacy. International support should promote, not undermine, national leadership and responsibility.

### **DDR within the context of wider security and justice sector reform (SSR)**

26. DDR is likely to fail if it is being implemented in an environment where the potential target groups feel insecure in terms of a perceived or real threat of violence from other parties and a perceived or real inadequacy of protection measures offered. Hence, it is important that the DDR process is coordinated with broader security sector reform (SSR) where the latter is planned or ongoing. In the longer term, the focus of SSR should be to establish effective governance, oversight and accountability of the security system; improve delivery of security and justice services; develop local leadership and ownership of the reform process; and promote sustainability of justice and security service delivery. These issues should be addressed by the peace settlement, but where a peace agreement is lacking, the immediate security vacuum must be addressed, including through DDR, while considering the future security needs of the country.

27. Whether and how to incorporate former combatants into national military forces is a complex issue. This may be an appropriate temporary measure, but goes against the aim of downsizing a national military after war fighting. In addition, those allegedly culpable of abuses should not be incorporated into the military. In addition, there is much international debate regarding how much time ex-combatants should spend in cantonment sites, after they have been registered for DDR programmes and their weapons handed in.

28. Peace agreements almost always address issues of transitional justice in some form. DDR and SSR should also be linked to these processes where they exist and to any amnesties. Care must be taken to ensure that those responsible for violations of international humanitarian law are not integrated into the national armed forces but are dealt with appropriately. Effective DDR removes the command structures of armed groups and should prevent those responsible for international crimes from benefiting from the DDR process.

29. DDR requires a legal framework – not just the terms of a ceasefire or peace agreement. Transitional governments in stabilisation contexts are hard pressed to enact legislation. It may be that the pre-conflict legislation or the military justice code can provide an effective framework of law, to underpin the discipline and authority required during DDR. International law provides a useful and necessary framework.

### **Eligibility for DDR assistance**

30. The goal of a DDR programme is to ensure security in an immediate post-conflict environment, by eliminating the threat posed by former combatants. Although of wider benefit to society, DDR programmes should not be seen as support programmes for the entire conflict-affected population, or a tool for socio-economic recovery. They need to be complemented by such programmes, which should be designed concurrently and adequately funded. DDR programmes have to be clear about the primary target group, eligibility criteria and benefits to be offered. These must be communicated to all groups affected by a DDR process.

31. While the peace agreement will generally state or otherwise indicate which armed forces and armed groups<sup>2</sup> will participate in DDR, the development of detailed and transparent eligibility criteria for individual combatants to enter into the programme is a

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<sup>2</sup> “Armed forces” refers to the national / state armed forces. “Armed groups” are distinct from these (Art. 4 Optional Protocol on the involvement of children in armed conflict to the Convention on the Rights of the Child)

priority in the initial assessment and planning phase. These criteria should avoid allowing persons to enter the programme only where they have surrendered weapons or ammunition. Rather, the criteria should be based on tests to determine an individual's membership of an armed force or group. All those who are found to be members of an armed force or group, whether they were involved in active combat or in support roles (such as cooks, porters, messengers, administrators, sex slaves and 'war wives'), shall be considered part of the armed force or group and therefore shall be included in the DDR programme.

### **Cash packages as reinsertion benefits**

32. Reinsertion assistance can last up to one year, while reintegration aims to be more sustainable. The choice of cash packages for reinsertion is controversial as ex-combatants have sometimes spent money on items with little positive impact, including weapons. Cash should never be given to children. However, some practitioners now believe that cash payments are simpler and more effective for adult ex-combatants than other forms of transitional assistance such as food or goods. Serial payments, or even micro-finance, over a longer period may offset some negative impacts. If cash is used, the emphasis should be on the payment as a needs allowance. It can also be given to the family, rather than to the ex-combatant alone.

### **The need for effective reintegration**

33. DDR programmes are often undermined because of lack of sustainable reintegration. Even during the stabilisation phase, when there is real urgency to begin disarmament and demobilisation, planning for reintegration must begin. Reintegration is viewed by many as the final component of DDR; inevitably attention begins to turn elsewhere once disarmament and demobilisation have been undertaken. Conceptually, reintegration should be viewed as an ongoing activity that is bolstered by ongoing SSR and development initiatives. However, in the past, commitments to reintegration initiatives have proved too short and have become unsustainable. In addition, reintegration activities are often cut short due to funding difficulties and the assumption that other programmes will support reintegration. Getting the balance between targeted assistance to one group, and investing in overall economic recovery and development is especially difficult when stability is fragile and the economy weak. Research will be required to understand what types of reintegration activities will work in the context.

34. In many cases there is a significant time lag between the disarmament/demobilisation and reintegration components (and the reintegration support). This causes combatants and communities to lose faith in the programme and those who are delivering it, and give them cause to rejoin/reform an armed group and/or participate in banditry or other criminal activity. Box 2 provides evidence of the problems associated with time delays from DDR programmes in Afghanistan and Northern Uganda.

## **Box 2: The Danger of Delays in Delivering Reintegration in Afghanistan and Northern Uganda**

### **Afghanistan:**

There are nearly 2,500 former combatants in the north who have been waiting for 6 months [for their reintegration packages] and both they and their communities are extremely angry over the delay which has put them in a financially precarious situation and caused unnecessary social stress on the communities. The responsibility for the delay lies largely with the donors and Afghanistan New Beginnings Programme who did not sign the contracts for the reintegration packages until two months after most of the soldiers had been disarmed.

Source: Dennys, C (2005:4) Disarmament, Demobilisation and Rearmament? The effects of disarmament in Afghanistan. Japan Afghan NGO Network

### **Northern Uganda:**

One of the objectives of UNDPs Transition to Recovery Programme (TRP) was to pilot support for programmes aimed at reintegration of adult ex-combatants living in IDP camps in the Gulu District of Northern Uganda. The TRP aims to complement existing programmes (undertaken by Government of Uganda/Amnesty Commission/World Bank) by providing training in livelihood initiatives (such as baking, bee keeping and agriculture), to former members of the Lords Resistance Army (LRA). UNDP funds the initiative but it is implemented by a UNDP contracted private sector organisation. By April 2006 training and sensitisation had taken place but by November 2006 'beneficiaries' were still waiting for their livelihood support reintegration packages.

There was a great deal of resentment from those who were trained but were still waiting for full reintegration packages. As one ex-combatant who had spent over five years in the LRA summarised: *'When we were trained our hopes increased, we had been in the bush [with the LRA] for so long and were hurting, but we finally had the chance to be productive and better ourselves, this could be our profession - not all is lost we thought, life can improve. But now nothing. It would have been better if you [UNDP] had not raised our hopes at all, rather than betrayed our trust and give us so much hope only to desert us. It's like UNDP used our misfortune to get money for themselves at our expense and have given us nothing'*.

The current situation is made more acute and regrettable because many ex-combatants are hoping (like many other IDPs) that they will soon be able to return to their villages where such equipment would have been essential for their livelihoods.

Source: Jones, R (2007:61) Evaluation of the UNDP Transition to Recovery Programme, Post-war Reconstruction and Development Unit, University of York, UK

35. Reintegration programmes should recognise that former combatants have capacities that can contribute to the social, political and economic development of a country emerging from conflict. Reintegrating ex-combatants into impoverished communities, without activities to increase communities' absorption capacity, will undermine the DDR programme and can place additional burdens on community members, particularly women. Hence, reintegration activities and benefits should not just be limited to the ex-combatants; their families and receiving communities also benefit.

36. DDR contributes to create a 'peace dividend' which will become more substantial as longer term development initiatives are rolled out. In the stabilisation context development gains are frequently absent, so consideration should be given to Quick Impact Projects and similar initiatives. When other stabilisation and recovery programmes invest in employment creation and boost local economies, they can have a significant impact on economic recovery, and the reintegration of demobilised soldiers will be more successful. Box 3 uses the example of Rwanda to show how DDR can be linked to longer term development initiatives and prioritised under national poverty reduction frameworks.

### **Box 3: DDR as part of the State Led National Poverty Reduction Strategy in Rwanda**

Rwanda's Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper (PRSP) was launched in 2002 after four years of preparation. The PRSP is the country's most important policy planning document, with government and the international community working within its rubric. It is the guiding plan for the country's political and socio-economic development. The PRSP recognises the unique reintegration challenges posed by the high numbers of ex-combatants that have gone through the DDR process.

The need to support demobilisation poses a specific challenge. Demobilised soldiers are a valuable human resource, often possessing organisational skills. It is critical that this group has economic opportunities, and some temporary support will be provided to help them reintegrate into civilian life.

Two major forms of support have been given. First, there has been a 'safety net' cash payment for demobilised Rwandan Patriotic Army (RPA) soldiers. The allowance needed to support a veteran for ten months is estimated at Rwf 90,000 for shelter and Rwf 270,000 for living costs. An allowance of this kind will be paid to demobilised RPA soldiers. Secondly, since 1999 support was provided in the form of formal and vocational education (provided by the Veterans Vocational Centre in Butare), microfinance and toolkits.

There is also a need to allocate land for those veterans who wish to return to rural areas (as the majority do) and have no land already. All returnees need this form of support. Additionally, health support needs to be provided including voluntary HIV testing and counselling, and information for behavioural change.

Policy issues arising are:

- The level of the safety net allowance needs to be set at an affordable level, given the numbers of people who will qualify for it.
- The kind of training provided needs to be linked to the private sector's demand for skills and integrated into the general policy on training and employment generation.
- The strategy for community-based labour-intensive public works, will offer opportunities for ex-soldiers to exercise their practical and organisational skills.

Source: Government of Rwanda (2002:58) National Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper, Ministry of Finance and Economic Planning.

37. There are two major challenges to improve economic reintegration: to provide sustainable support to entrepreneurs to increase their chances of success, and to invest simultaneously in increasing the employability of former combatants and creating the enabling environment for local economic development. Without targeted investment in local economies, reintegration fails and communities may perceive ex-combatants to be uniquely privileged by the DDR process.

## **Resources and further information**

- UK Approach to Stabilisation  
<http://www.stabilisationunit.gov.uk/>
- Security Sector Reform Stabilisation Issues Note  
<http://www.stabilisationunit.gov.uk/>
- Economic Recovery Stabilisation Issues Note  
<http://www.stabilisationunit.gov.uk/>
- Post-Conflict Disarmament, Demobilisation and Reintegration: A UK View (10 October 2006) Internal use only, available from Richard Jones ([r-jones@stabilisationunit.gov.uk](mailto:r-jones@stabilisationunit.gov.uk))
- The Military Contribution to Security Sector Reform Joint Doctrine Note 3/07. Available from Richard Jones ([r-jones@stabilisationunit.gov.uk](mailto:r-jones@stabilisationunit.gov.uk))
- The UN Integrated DDR Standards (2006)  
<http://www.unddr.org/>
- The Paris Principles and Guidelines on Children Associated with Armed Forces or Armed Groups (2007)  
[http://www.un.org/children/conflict/documents/parisprinciples/ParisPrinciples\\_EN.pdf](http://www.un.org/children/conflict/documents/parisprinciples/ParisPrinciples_EN.pdf)
- OECD Handbook on Security Sector Reform 2007
- Multi-country Demobilisation and Reintegration Programme (MDRP) for the Greater Great Lakes  
<http://www.mdrp.org/>
- Disarmament, Demobilisation and Reintegration: Mapping Issues, Dilemmas and Guiding Principles, Nicole Ball and Luc van de Goor (2006)  
[www.clingendael.nl/cru](http://www.clingendael.nl/cru)
- UN Security Council Resolution 1325 (Women, Peace and Security)  
<http://www.peacewomen.org/un/sc/1325.html>